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Introduction
1.1 What is Neuro-IT.net ?
Neuro-it.net is a Thematic Network (TN) dedicated to NeuroIT. 1 NeuroIT.net has various tasks:
the organization of reviews and workshops where members from various disciplines can meet
and get to know each other, to establish contacts between academic institutes and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), to stimulate schooling and training in the ﬁeld of NeuroIT, and last
but not least, to draft a Roadmap. At the start, 54 institutes and SMEs comprised NeuroIT.net.
At the time of writing 111 researchers from 82 institutes and SMEs, divided over 16 nations
make up NeuroIT.net. NeuroIT.net has its own website: http://www.neuro-it.net and
a mailing list, which can be found via the website.
1.2 What is a Roadmap ?
A Roadmap is a document, which describes the current state-of-the-art of the ﬁeld, as well as a
vision of which research will interesting, challenging and beneﬁcial for the ﬁeld over a relatively
long period of time (a decade or more). It serves as a reference for funding agencies, but also for
scientists. The EU has expressed great interest in the creation of a Roadmap: future calls within
FP6 may be based on the content of the Roadmap, and also may help to decide if, and which,
new ﬁelds will be addressed in FP7. Currently, one Roadmap already exists: the Roadmap for
Nanoelectronics (NE), which can be found on the web at:
http://www.cordis.lu/ist/fetnidqf.htm
1.3 Introduction to the purpose of this roadmap
The aim of Neuro-IT.net, the EU Neuro-IT Network of Excellence, is to build a critical mass
of new interdisciplinary research excellence at the interface between NS (Neurosciences) and
1A Thematic Network is one of the Instruments of the employed by the 5th Framework Programme(FP) of the
European Union. Framework Programmes are the EU’s main instrument for research funding in Europe. FP6 has
been in operation since January 1, 2003 (European Commission, 1998), which coincides with the start of Neu-
roIT.net, although ofﬁcially this Neuro-IT.net an FP5 initiative.
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IT (Information Technologies) within the European Union and its Associated States. The term
Neuro-IT was coined to express clearly that the disciplines merged under the umbrella of Neuro-
IT.net form a new scientiﬁc working area, which is different from what is traditionally called
Neuro-Informatics (NI).
The objective is to complement and move beyond the well established NI (NeuroInformatics)
or AI (Artiﬁcial Intelligence) domains by fostering research that would beneﬁt both the NS and
IT communities by helping solve the fundamental problems linked to the emergence and the
modelling of cognitive and awareness processes as well issues related to physical growth, phylo-
genesis and ontogenesis. The goal is for IT to proﬁt from NS results to improve IT artefacts and
for NS to validate models or hypotheses with a better use of IT.
Neuro-IT.net is therefore particularly committed to
1. making known the potential of the basic research conducted within the EU funded initia-
tives and
2. spearheading the emergence of completely new visionary long term research objectives
that could fully exploit the potential of collaboration between Neurosciences and Informa-
tion Technology.
In this context, the role of Neuro-IT.net is not to support incremental research, no matter how
excellent, but to help to discover new unexplored research domains that could lead to break-
through in Neuro-IT in the long term. A central guiding question in this respect is: ’What can
neuroscience do for IT’ ?
To make this highly abstract goal concrete, the members of Neuro-IT.net have agreed to develop
a roadmap, which is in the form of “Grand Challenges”. Taken together, these challenges cover
a broad scope of what we image to result from Neuro-IT research. However, each of these
challenges is in itself a demanding research programme, laid out to lead to tangible results,
both in terms of very basic scientiﬁc research and in the development of technology leading to
prototypes, which can show the potential for new products.
The challenges are summarized in the executive summaries, below.
TheRoadmapforNeuroITwillbethesecondRoadmapthatwillbecreated, theNano-Electronics
(NE)Roadmapwastheﬁrst. It willbe verydifferentfromtheNE Roadmap, which wasdescribed
from the perspective of a mature and powerful industry.
1.4 What is the status of this document ?
This document, version 1.1, is a draft. It contains a few new challenges, which will most likely
be merged into one in a future version. This publication of this version coincides with a ’webcon-
sultation’ that will be held by the EU in early October 2003. The results of this webconsultation
will help determine the next steps that will be taken. Comments, proposals and criticism can be
sent to roadmap@neuro-it.net at all times1.5. WHERE CAN THIS DOCUMENT BE FOUND ? 9
1.5 Where can this document be found ?
The latest version of this document will be maintained on NeuroIT.net’s web site:
http://www.neuro-it.net.
1.6 Executive summaries
1.6.1 Executive summary of the Brainship Project
Recent progress in fundamental neurophysiological research suggests that a popular subject of
science ﬁction movies may soon be technically possible: direct interfacing of the human brain
with computers, either in embodied external devices or incorporated into the human body. De-
velopment of better electrodes and of fast signal processing techniques have allowed chronic
implantation of large arrays of recording electrodes in rodents and monkeys. The major break-
through was the demonstration of a high level of plasticity in the mammalian brain, allowing it to
adapt its signals to communication over a limited number of channels. Nevertheless all present
demonstrations are one-directional, usually involving the use of signals from motor cortical ar-
eas to control virtual devices. For real-life applications, like the control of paralyzed limbs or
complex prosthetic devices, bi-directional interfacing will be necessary so that the brain can use
its sophisticated feedback control strategies.
Bi-directional brain computer interfacing (BBCI) holds therefore great promise in the treatment
of neurological and trauma patients. More controversial applications of BBIC lie in the direct
control of remote robotic devices and information systems. Before this highly invasive technique
can be applied to humans further development is needed on multiple fronts. Particular areas
of concern are the lack of direct sensory input, necessary for feedback motor control in loco-
motion, poor understanding of neural coding outside of primary motor regions and longevity of
implanted electrodes. These goals problems will be covered under the primary goal of the Brain
Interface project: the development of an awake animal model where the brain interacts with the
environment only through BBCI techniques, in other words both sensory input and motor activ-
ity will be channeled through computer interfaces. Additionally we will promote discussion and
development of guidelines for the ethical use of BBCI in humans.
To augment human interaction with its environment by enabling direct interfacing to sophisti-
cated perception, robotic, prosthetic and information systems. Present technology requires in-
vasive methods which will be enhanced to create bidirectional brain interfaces for control of
high-dimensional systems. Both neurophysiological and IT technologies will need to be greatly
advanced to allow interfacing at a natural cognitive level or to embed the brain at an appropriate
level in an artiﬁcial sensori-motor loop.
1.6.2 Executive Summary of the Factor-10 Project
Both the emerging ﬁelds of epigentic robotics and “smart” materials science offer a wealth of in-
novative research opportunities and promise a large spectrum of new products to become feasible
in the mid to very long term. However, a completely new discipline may develop by combining10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
key research in these ﬁelds to work towards new types of artefacts. We envision three types of
such artefacts to emerge from this combination: (i) artefacts evolving their cognition and mo-
tor control autonomously based on multimodal/multisensory feedback in a predeﬁned and ﬁxed
body, (ii) artefacts that evolve new skills in structural coupling with the environment but with
bodies/effectors that ﬂexibly adapt their shapes to structurally different tasks and (iii) artefacts
that co-evolve their brains and their body in permanent interaction with the enviroment over an
extended period of their lifetime (embodied artiﬁcial ontogenesis).
While the implementation of the ﬁrst type of artefacts largely depends on progress in control
architectures of cognitive systems, the latter two will also draw heavily on methods and tech-
nology developed in materials science for self-assembling materials and structures. Even more
so, type (iii) above may be be seen as a new interpretation of smart materials with tailor-made
functionalities for building up macro-structures with integrated sensing and cognitive abilities.
While artefacts of ﬁrst and second type can be seen as classical allopoeitic machines, the third
type of artefact needs a completely fresh approach in that it can only be realised as an autopoietic
machine built from cells, i.e. “from the inside out”. To make these extreme challenges an easy-
to-communicate research project that everybody can relate to, we propose to deﬁne a long-term
venture called “Factor-10”, which aims at a fully functional physical artefact (i.e. not a computer
simulation), which, during an extended but limited period of time (e.g. 10 months) autonomously
grows
• the volume of its body by at least a factor of ten, thereby differentiating out “organs” and
“effectors” as well as
• its cognitive abilities (its “IQ” and its repertoire of sensorimotor behaviours), also by at
least a factor of ten.
Issues central to the development of living creatures that would have to be followed to a higher
or lesser degree for such an artefact, i.e. synchronous evolution of morphology and mind, have
hardly been formulated, let alone been tackled. Fortunately, due to the need for qualititative
breakthroughs at diverse research frontiers, there would be a window of opportunity for Euro-
peans to compete with Japanese research at the next stage of development – the Japanese advan-
tage in humanoids (type (i) above) research will hardly be caught up to. Looking at the precon-
ditions for embarking on this research journey, we note that a there is already a sizeable body of
research in the diverse necessary disciplines represented in Europe (see the non-exhaustive list
in the appendix), however with fragmentation across disciplines and countries.
Although the goals of Factor-10 are reaching far out into the future and well beyond what is
currently the set of obejctives in FP6, there are a number of items that can be related to the
“priroty thematic areas of research in FP6”, i.e. research will address autonomous self adapta-
tion [1.1.2.ii] of physical systems (artefacts) capable of responding intelligently to speech, ges-
ture or other senses [1.1.2.iv]. To obtain such artefacts, dedicated combined research both in the
areas of cognitive sciences and in the areas of self assembling materials and structures [1.1.3.i]
is both necessary and highly innovative. Moreover, some applications (e.g. intelligent prosthet-
ics) resulting from work undertaken in this NoE require substantial advances in the integration1.6. EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES 11
of biological and non-biological entities. Finally, the growing artefacts can be seen as a com-
pletely new interpretation of “smart” materials with tailor-made functionalities and for building
up macro-structures [1.1.3.ii].
Apart from the scientiﬁc objective of developing the basic technologies and actually designing
as well as building prototypes of type (iii) artefacts, it is also the purpose of the project to es-
tablish a commonly accepted paradigm for designing these artefacts. The goals of Factor-10 are
indeed very demanding. Up to now, they have hardly been formulated as a common integrating
challenge because of the deterring technological impediments in every single area involved. We
believe, however, that in view of the progress achieved in many of the disciplines, particularly
cognitive and neurosciences, Factor-10 comes at the right point in time. If Europe does not take
the lead now, it might miss yet another technology train.
1.6.3 Executive summary of the Constructed brain project
In the ’constructed brain’ it is argued that for a systematic development of cognitive engineering
principles in NeuroIT a comprehensive, framework is necessary that allows for the simulation
of an entire brain. Initially realized in software, lateron its protocols will allow interfacing with
hardware, thereby moving from a purely ’virtual brain’ to an ’embodied brain’, which may lead
to artefacts which have a substantial degree of autonomy and adaptability. As such it may be
considered a ’top-down’ approach for NeuroIT, whereas other challenges take a ’bottom-up’
approach.
The beneﬁts of such a ’constructed brain’ are manifold. First of all, we have not been very
succesful in the creation of autonomous, ﬂexible, and adapable artefacts, whereas even simple
biological creatures have amazing capabilities in this respect. A good understanding of neural
processing is clearly essential to understand why biological creatures are so good at ’cognitive
processing’. With such an understanding, it will be easier to judge, whether we can cast bi-
ological information processing principles into existing hardware and the systematic design of
cognitive engineering principles for NeuroIT will be possible. It may even lead to formulations
of ’awareness’ and ’consciousness’, which are deﬁned in terms of large-scale neuronal systems
and this may be instrumental in studying the transfer of these concepts from biological systems
to artefacts.
Secondly, such a framework would lead to new and better ways to study the brain, for instance,
because it would allow for ’experiments’ which would be difﬁcult or unethical in human beings.
This, in turn, will have a profound impact on the treatment of psychological disorders, which are
a source of distress to many and a cause of substantial economical damage.
In the ’constructed brain’, the methodological and sociological issues are explored, which are
currently hampering the integration of the vast knowledge that we have on the brain already. It
is argued that, as long as there is no strong incentive for the various disciplines in brain research
to cooperate on common projects, this situation is not likely to improve. A ’constructed brain’
could provide such an incentive, since its creation would require the collaboration of scientists
from many disciplines.
A review is presented of techniques, which are potentially useful in integrating the vast, but frag-
mented, knowledge on the brain, which is distributed over many disciplines, into a framework12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
like the ’constructed brain’. Finally, suggestions are made to start up such a project.
It is interesting to look at other sciences which have established multi-disciplinary collaborations,
such as bioinformatics. It is clear that the Humane Genome Project has provided an enormous
drive for the coordination of many activities in this ﬁeld. Another ﬁeld which is centered around
large projects is high energy physics. The existence of only a few large accelerators in the
world has also created natural ’condensation points’ for this branch of science. In high energy
physics knowledge of electronics, heavy engineering (accelerators and detectors are huge), de-
tector physics and the underlying theoretical concepts of particle physics come together. High
energy physics has created WWW, and has developped software suites for detector simulation, data
analysis and visualisation, which are used by virtually every high energy physics laborotory in
the world. Moreover, its database techniques and projects for distributed computing (the GRID
project) draw much attention from other branches of science. This impressive computing infras-
tructure of high energy physics was developed by many people, from various disciplines, who
were working together to bring a highly ambitious single project to a good end.
1.6.4 Executive summary of the Tools for Neuroscience project
This chapter reviews the importance of brain research for information systems and technology
(IST). Notice that the importance of brain research does not just derive from these technological
needs. The medical justiﬁcation for brain research is overwhelming as 35 % of the disease
burden in Western Europe is due to brain diseases. Understanding the brain is also a human
objective, as we love and learn with our brains. Central to the strategy of brain research is the
uniqueness of the brain amongst the organs of the human body and the importance of the 1012
connections in the human brain. These connections deﬁne at least 5 levels of integration between
the molecules, and the genes encoding them, and behavior. Neglecting these intermediate levels,
as has been done recently in some programs, dooms brain research. While we have potent
techniques to address the lower levels of integration, we largely miss those addressing the supra-
neuronallevelsofintegrationcriticaltounderstandingbrainfunction. Thischaptersetsambitious
goals to overcome these shortcomings: to record from thousand electrodes in 5 different brain
regions while simultaneously obtaining high resolution multi-modal brain images and to develop
new mathematical tools to organize and understand this wealth of information. This chapter
stresses the need for education of the public in view of the ethical questions raised by the use of
non human primates, which is seen as critical for these developments of brain research. Indeed
non invasive techniques still lack in resolution. The alternative, in vivo studies, have to use
adequate animal models and for higher cognitive functions monkeys are the only valid model.
Unless these issues are better understood, brain and other pharmaceutical research will continue
to leave Europe, further undermining the position of Europe in the world. In conclusion a strong
investment into Brain Research will boost the collaboration between Neuroscience and robotics
which is fast developing and provide a major source of inspiration for the whole of IST.Chapter 2
The ’brain interface’ project
2.1 Introduction
Recent progress in fundamental neurophysiological research suggests that a popular subject of
science ﬁction movies may soon be technically possible: direct interfacing of the human brain
with computers, either in embodied external devices or incorporated into the human body. De-
velopment of better electrodes and of fast signal processing techniques have allowed chronic
implantation of large arrays of recording electrodes in rodents and monkeys. The major break-
through was the demonstration of a high level of plasticity in the mammalian brain, allowing it to
adapt its signals to communication over a limited number of channels. Nevertheless all present
demonstrations are one-directional, usually involving the use of signals from motor cortical ar-
eas to control virtual devices. For real-life applications, like the control of paralyzed limbs or
complex prosthetic devices, bi-directional interfacing will be necessary so that the brain can use
its sophisticated feedback control strategies.
Bi-directional brain computer interfacing (BBCI) holds therefore great promise in the treatment
of neurological and trauma patients. More controversial applications of BBIC lie in the direct
control of remote robotic devices and information systems. Before this highly invasive technique
can be applied to humans further development is needed on multiple fronts. Particular areas
of concern are the lack of direct sensory input, necessary for feedback motor control in loco-
motion, poor understanding of neural coding outside of primary motor regions and longevity of
implanted electrodes. These goals problems will be covered under the primary goal of the Brain
Interface project: the development of an awake animal model where the brain interacts with the
environment only through BBCI techniques, in other words both sensory input and motor activ-
ity will be channeled through computer interfaces. Additionally we will promote discussion and
development of guidelines for the ethical use of BBCI in humans.
2.2 Objectives
To augment human interaction with its environment by enabling direct interfacing to sophisti-
cated perception, robotic, prosthetic and information systems. Present technology requires in-
vasive methods which will be enhanced to create bidirectional brain interfaces for control of
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high-dimensional systems. Both neurophysiological and IT technologies will need to be greatly
advanced to allow interfacing at a natural cognitive level or to embed the brain at an appropriate
level in an artiﬁcial sensori-motor loop.
2.3 Examples
• Full-immersion teleoperation by mental control of remote exploratory vehicles equipped
with non-human sensors, ranging from microendoscopes to deep-sea vehicles with acous-
tic sensing to total teleaction over long distances.
• Interaction with information systems using direct perceptual input.
• Repairing paralyzed or amputated humans by interfacing the brain with external senso-
rimotor devices to control limbs or prosthetic devices, reintegrating a severely disabled
person into society.
• Initial test beds of the technology will be bionic animals that are completely dependent on
brain computer interfacing to interact with their environment.
2.4 Current state of technology
Despitetheongoingdebateaboutthenatureofthemovementparametersrepresentedbyneuronal
activity (Todorov, 2000), several recent studies investigated the possibility of predicting limb
movements from the activity of multiple single-neurons in the motor cortex. After initial studies
inrats(Chapin, Moxon, Markowitz, &Nicolelis, 1999), thiswasappliedsuccessfullytomonkeys
(Wessberg et al., 2000; Serruya, Hatsopoulos, Paninski, Fellows, & Donoghue, 2002; Taylor,
2002). The main objective of these studies was to ﬁnd ways to control an external device in
real-time (e.g. a cursor on a computer screen or a robot arm) using signals recorded from the
brain. Such techniques could potentially be the basis of neuronal motor prostheses (Chapin et al.,
1999; Fetz, 1999; Laubach, Wessberg, & Nicolelis, 2000; Wessberg et al., 2000; Nicolelis, 2001;
Craelius, 2002; Serruyaetal., 2002; Taylor, 2002; Kvnig&F., 2002; Wickelgren, 2003). Amajor
conceptual breakthrough in this direction was achieved by two recent experiments demonstrating
the feasibility of real-time brain-control of a computer cursor in two (Serruya et al. 2002) or
three (Taylor et al. 2002) dimensions under closed-loop conditions (i.e. the brain signals directly
control the cursor). An intended target reach could be decoded from the activity of only 7-
30 neurons, when the subject had visual feedback of their brain-driven cursor movement. An
important ﬁnding in both rat and monkey studies was that the animals continued to learn under
closed loop conditions, implying an adaptation of the intrinsic brain signals recorded by the
implanted electrodes, due to modulation or real plasticity.
While these animal studies are important proofs of principle, few have attempted realistic neu-
roprosthetic applications. The monkey study where movement of a robot arm was controlled
succesfully (Wessberg et al., 2000) did not (yet) attempt to use this arm for a real task. In fact,
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(Chapin et al., 1999). The problem in controlling robot arms or similar devices in realistic con-
texts is the absence of somatosensory feedback in current experimental designs. The only form
of sensory feedback the animals receive is visual and this is not sufﬁcient to grasp objects or to
perform complex manipulations (Johansson, 1996; Todorov & Jordan, 2002).
Another limitation of the current approaches are the simple algorithms for spike train decoding:
Taylor, Helms-Tillery, and Schwartz (2002) used cosine tuning functions to represent neuronal
ﬁring frequency as a function of movement direction, and the population vector approach (Geor-
gopoulos A. P., 1986) to extract the population-average of the directional information contained
in the activity of single neurons. Chapin et al. (1999), Wessberg et al. (2000), Serruya et al.
(2002)used a linear ﬁlter for movement reconstruction, which did not make any speciﬁc assump-
tions about the neuronal code. Based on realistic models for the neuronal encoding of movement,
however, more accurate and robust decoding algorithms can be constructed. Those will certainly
be needed to control effectors with many degrees of freedom.
2.5 Problem areas
Neuroscience:
• Identifying optimal brain regions for electrode implantation to use BCI in different tasks,
try to get highest information rate for low number of recording points.
• Identifying the coding strategy used in these brain areas necessary to develop correspond-
ing representations in software systems.
• Understanding how the brain integrates sensory and motor systems both in fast motor
control and in decision.
• Understanding the limitations to cortical plasticity necessary to get optimal signal transfer
through the BCI.
Technology:
• Stimulation electrode arrays to allow direct input to the brain of spatiotemporal sensory
data.
• Longevity and durability of electrodes which need to be suitable for chronic implantation
in humans. Study long-term effects.
• Research on alternatives to implanted electrodes.
• Miniaturize all the electrophysiological equipment (ﬁlters, ampliﬁers, spike detectors),
combine it with the control software and put it into wireless, battery operated conﬁgu-
rations.
• Sensors and actuators which must have a performance as good or better than natural ones.16 CHAPTER 2. THE ’BRAIN INTERFACE’ PROJECT
IT:
• Real-time encoding/decoding software for brain input/output signals, algorithms robust to
noise, changes in signal quality and brain plasticity.
• Calibration/training methods to maximize signal transfer over limited number of channels.
Make use of ability of natural brains to switch fast between different coding schemes.
• Methods for shared control versus partial autonomy in real-time brain robot interaction.
• Effective strategies for perception/decision/action chain in robotics necessary for partial
autonomous action.
Ethical:
• Invasive technology may cause brain damage. When is this acceptable in patients? Is it at
all acceptable in normal humans?
• Brain plasticity may interfere with the normal operation of the human brain.
2.6 Future research
The program will focus on fully establishing BBCI technology in animal models and on devel-
oping ethical guidelines for future use in humans. Technology and materials development geared
toward human application should be covered by other programs.
The goal of this challenge is to develop bidirectional bionic animals, deﬁned as animals which
use BCI both for sensory input and to interact with their environment. Interaction can be by
controlling either a robot or a prosthetic device which allows the animal to move itself. In these
models the brain closes the loop between computer controlled sensory input and computer driven
action or motor activity. BBCI technology will ﬁrst be developed in rodents and subsequently
ported to application in monkeys. Application in rodents will include BBCI driven navigation
and exploration while the monkey model is more appropriate to develop BBCI control of pros-
thetic limbs.
2.7 Immediate goals
• Identifying optimal brain regions for BCI for limb control in monkeys.
• Studyingintegrationofsomatosensoryinputwithfastmotorcontrolinrodentsormonkeys.
• Development of stimulation electrode arrays to allow direct input to the brain of spatiotem-
poral sensory data.
• Miniaturization of wireless neurophysiological equipment.
• Development of better sensors and actuators.2.8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 17
• Developmentofreal-timeencoding/decodingsoftwareforbraininput/outputsignalswhich
is robust to noise, changes in signal quality and brain plasticity.
• Study methods for shared control versus partial autonomy in real-time brain robot interac-
tion.
• Create interfaces between scientists, clinicians and patient organizations to deﬁne ethical
standards for use of BBCI in human patients.
2.8 Ethical considerations
This challenge will develop new technology which can have great impact on human society,
both at the personal and sociological level. Current technology allows only for highly invasive
interface devices and therefore their use should be restricted to situations where they are deemed
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Mind-Body Co-Evolution: The Factor-10
Project
3.1 Introduction
Both the emerging ﬁelds of epigentic robotics and “smart” materials science offer a wealth of
innovative research opportunities and promise a large spectrum of new products to become fea-
sible in the mid to long term. However, a completely new discipline may develop by combining
key research in these ﬁelds to work towards new types of artefacts. We envision three types of
such artefacts to emerge from this combination
• Type I: artefacts evolving their cognition and motor control autonomously based on mul-
timodal/multisensory feedback in a predeﬁned and ﬁxed body, whose structure may be
optimised to perform a certain class of tasks (designed to a certain “ecology” – as is fre-
quently the case for living organisms), e.g. the “dancing robot” of the AI lab at Zurich
University or the “classical” humanoid robots;
• Type II: artefacts that evolve new skills in structural coupling with the environment but
with bodies/effectors that ﬂexibly adapt their shapes to structurally different tasks, e.g.
– robots with effectors made from material with mechanical plasticity, such as shape
memory alloys and/or autonomous control intelligence (peripheral nervous system)
in these limbs, like truly dextrous “hands” with a highly developed sense of touch, or
– ﬁne grained versions of the current attempts to design “modular robots” that may
change their body shape to some extent by combining basic actuator modules into
different shapes,
and
• TypeIII:artefactsthatco-evolvetheir(possiblydistributed)brains(system)andtheirbody
in permanent interaction with the enviroment over an extended period of their lifetime
(embodied artiﬁcial ontogenesis).
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While the implementation of the ﬁrst type of artefacts largely depends on progress in control ar-
chitectures of cognitive systems, the latter two will also draw heavily on methods and technology
developed in materials science for self-assembling materials and structures, “constructive chem-
istry” and – most probably – proteomics. In particular, the third type may be be seen as a new
interpretationofsmart materialswith tailor-madefunctionalities forbuildingupmacro-structures
with integrated sensing and cognitive abilities.
While artefacts of ﬁrst and second type can be seen as classical allopoeitic machines, i.e. ma-
chines that are designed and built “from the outside in”, we hold that the third type of artefact
needs a fresh approach in that it can only be realised as an autopoietic machine built from cells,
each of which implements a full recursive plan for bodily development and behaviour in a given
enviroment similar or identical to the genetic code in the cells of living organisms.
Followingtheselinesofthought, weproposetodeﬁnealong-termresearchprojectcalled“Factor-
10” or Factor-X, which aims at fully functional physical artefact (i.e. not a computer simulation),
which, during an extended but limited period of time (e.g. 10 months) autonomously grows
• the volume of its body by at least a factor of ten, thereby differentiating out “organs” and
“effectors” as well as
• its cognitive abilities (its “IQ” and its repertoire of sensorimotor behaviours), also by at
least a factor of ten.
This vision is obviously largely inspired by the development of living organisms and the theory
of “enactive” or action-centred cognition by Varela (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) – intel-
ligence and autonomy in can only emerge in embodied creatures (and artefacts) as the result of
their permanent interaction with a real enviroment. Based on this theory, one may even argue
that eventually the implementation of such artefacts would be based on (modiﬁed) biological
substrates (an hence become a case for genetics) because nature has solved exactly the same
problems of survivial on the earth in the optimal way – through creating living organisms for the
most diverse ecological niches. This would entail, however, not only massive ethical problems,
it would also delimit the range of size of the basic building blocks (i.e. biological cells) and –
depending on their machanical stability – the size and properties of the artefacts. It would also
require the problems of artiﬁcial metabolims to be solved.1
We hold that it might not be desirable but necessary to begin Factor-10 related research by study-
ing the challenges and promises of the concept of artiﬁcial growth using “dead matter” as a
starting point and – only due to technological deﬁcits – treat mind development and bodily adap-
tation through (and for) interaction with the environment as two separate problems. Being aware
1After all, this should be considered an additional challenge – not an impediment. There can be no doubt that a
highly efﬁcient and lasting energy supply is an indispensable constituent of autonomous artefacts. It is quite likely
that the solution to the totally inadequate energy cycles based on electrical batteries may be found in copying the
chemical pathways found in life. One may even argue that the search for food (not to be confused with simple
search for a battery loading dock), which is a special kind of interaction with the environment under time pressure
that has direct consequences on the constitution of the body, is an essential driver for mind development and cannot
be separated from the artefact growth process. Whilst of high importance in its own right, research into adequate
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of this conceptual deﬁcit, we should permanently aim at overcoming this artiﬁcial separation as
soon as possible and capitalise on every technology advance that offers a potential to do so. In
particular, research in (molecular) biology should be constantly monitored and and regularly be
evaluated for progress made there for applicability to any of the research areas contributing to
Factor-10.
3.2 Motivation and objective
For at least the last ﬁve decades the general public has been promised the advent of universal
robots or even human-like artefacts that would be of real help to us in our daily lives and/or
possess super-human capabilities. However, as expectations rose, science consistently failed to
deliver robots that can be compared to biological creatures, not even to those with very low-level
intelligence.
Notwithstanding this failure, enormous progress has been made in many ﬁelds potentially con-
tributing to the design of truly autonomous artefacts of types II and III outlined above, such as
brain and cognitive science, information technology and artiﬁcial intelligence, molecular biology
and chemistry that the time is ripe to combine/integrate them into new systems with autonomy
and control intelligence distributed over their entire body, which in turn may adapt smoothly to
a speciﬁc task.
Moreover, apart from being one the most exciting research goals to pursue, artefacts that can –
at least to some modest degree – develop an autonomy of their own in the literal sense of the
word2, would also be an economical market that cannot be underestimated.3 Despite current
wave of euphoria for humanoid robots – largely fueled by industrial companies like Honda and
Kawada but also by applied and basic research projects as the Japanese HRP program and the
Kawato Dynamic brain projects and its continuations –, it will soon become clear that these
machines (type I according to the above classiﬁcation) are impressive feats of engineering and
highly interesting platforms for developing basic technologies, but they hardly lend themselves
to any practical use outside of robot labs. Only when the qualitative transition to type II artefacts
can be achieved will we see practical solutions that will ﬁnd acceptance by a broader public for
many interesting applications (see (Knoll, 2002) for an incomplete overview).
However, issues central to the development of living creatures that would have to be followed
to a higher or lesser degree for type III artefacts, i.e. synchronous evolution of morphology
and mind, have hardly been formulated, let alone been tackled. Fortunately, due to the need
for a qualititative breakthrough, already from type I to type II artefacts, and the high quality of
European research in the aforementioned disciplies contributing to type II and – in the longer run
– type III development, there would be a window of opportunity for Europeans to compete with
2Meaning “give oneself one’s own laws of behaviour” through “living a plan” by evolving all aspects of one’s
being there, instead of just executing a designer’s plan (Ziemke, 2001).
3While about 10 years ago the market for service robot and/or assistance systems (for both home and factory
use) was projected to be larger than 1 billion EUR by the year 2000, only very few such service robots (less than
one thousand) have actually been deployed so far. The world market for standard ﬁxed production robots is about
100,000 units per year; it could also grow drastically if the perception and task-adaptation abilities of these robots
increased substantially and their programming efforts were reduced just as drastically.22 CHAPTER 3. MIND-BODY CO-EVOLUTION: THE FACTOR-10 PROJECT
Japanese research at the next stage of development – the Japanse advantage in humanoids (type
I) research will hardly be caught up to.4
Looking at the preconditions for embarking on this research journey, we note that a there is
already a sizeable body of research in the diverse necessary disciplines represented in Europe
(see the non-exhaustive list in the appendix), however with fragmentation across disciplines and
countries.
Apart from the scientiﬁc objective of developing the basic technologies and actually designing
as well as building prototypes of type III artefacts – via type II as an intermediate goal – along
a far-stretched time line, it is also the purpose of the project to establish a commonly accepted
paradigm for designing these artefacts. Initially, recent results will be collected and translating
into a language common to all the disciplines. More importantly, however, is the development of
completely new theories, methods and paradigms controlled by carefully studying how the meth-
ods from one ﬁeld can guide the research directions in another (e.g. by evaluating research results
on imitation from psychophysics to deﬁne paradigms of machine imitation learning that can be
translated into computer-operational algorithms). In parallel, for every milestone reached, its
application potential inside and outside of the artefacts will be studied so as to ensure feedback
to the research community of the newly developed ﬁeld as to what features would be particu-
larly useful to have in real systems, e.g. robustness and safety after failure, behaviour stability,
reaction-times, cross-modal sensory input processing etc. – all in dynamic, unpredictable, ad-
verse and partly unknown or even completely unseen, uncharted real-world environments.
The goals of Factor-10 are indeed very demanding. Up to now, they have hardly been formulated
as a common integrating challenge because of the deterring technological impediments in every
single area involved. We believe, however, that in view of the progress achieved in many of the
disciplines, particularly cognitive and neurosciences, Factor-10 comes at the right point in time.
If Europe does not take the lead now, it might miss yet another technology train.
3.3 State of the art and projection from today’s viewpoint
As of this writing, there is a small body of published work on experimental systems, design
simulations, materials analysis and proposals for architectures that may serve as starting points
for further research, in particular:
• Modular robots that are built from a certain number of identical motor modules and can
be combined into different shapes and macro structures (e.g. (Kamimura et al., 2001); see
(project, 2003) for an overview).
• Evolutionary and epigenetics robotics both in the sense that robot shapes are optimised
(e.g. (Funes & Pollack, 1999)) according to certain target functions and that the principles
of autonomous learning based on very basic instincts is concerned (e.g. (Nolﬁ & Floreano,
2000))
4Honda claims to have invested in excess of US$ 100 mio. into their humanoids development program, which
started in 1986, and the Japanese Humanoids Research Program (HRP) received another US$ 25 mio. of direct
funding. Other Japanese giants like Sony, Fujitsu, etc. have not disclosed their ﬁgures – but they may be just as
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• Microscale structures that can be assembled according to external conditions and that can
serve as ﬁlters, modulators, etc. for chemical reactions, e.g. (?, )
• Nanoscaleself-asemblingstructureswereproposedthatcanbuildupaggregatesofmacro-
scopic size, e.g. for “muscle tissue” (?, ?, FHG-TEG) that can be made to grow and exhibit
useful properties, such as need for joints without lubricants, etc. As far as this ﬁeld is con-
cerned, were are conﬁdent to proﬁt from nanotechnology (including nanomanipulation) to
provide us with materials that can be used in different functions in the artefact. Of partic-
ular interest would be the technlogy that enables nanostructures (e.g. nanoscale motors) to
build up in a controlled way – as long as these technologies have the potential to be used in
an artefact. This would rule out the use of processes that rely on extremely high voltages
or extremely high external pressures for the structures to from themselves.
This is just a selection of the competences needed to be integrated for a ﬁrst step along the type III
developments. Obviously, all of these ﬁelds are only in their beginning as far as the use of their
potential for speciﬁc contributions to our goals are concerned. There are a number of research
areas that may directly contribute through elucidating principles of biological development in
view of what is needed for type III artefacts:
1. Developmental biology: Compilation of the essential principles that enable living organ-
isms to differentiate cells to form large bodies with speciﬁc organs, but also the principles
that led to the formation of both motor and sensor entities, e.g. what drives phylogenesis to
get from a single photoreceptor to “open” insect facet eyes and then on to lense-based eyes,
what are the driving factors behind the development of different locomotion principles, in
particular muscle-joint constructs, etc.
2. Genetics: Contribute a set of rules that allow to encode a certain minimal set of “genes”
which allow stable bodily development but also the control of the communication between
the individual body cells so that they can – in interaction with the enviroment of the artefact
– develop a certain desired behaviour. A controlled modiﬁcation of these genes should also
result in a predictable change of behaviour development of the artefact.
3. Computational Neuroscience: Given the freedom of growth and structural developments
of information processing entities in the artefact (but also the severe technological con-
straints), develop appropriate basic processors (neurons) along with their interaction prin-
ciples and communication networks/mechanisms that enable the parallel and interleaved
emergence of motor skills and cognitive skills taking into account the hypotheses about
structural coupling according to Varela. Clarify issues of “assemblies” and regions of the
basic processors building up and structuring themselves according to the genetic code dur-
ing the artefact’s evolution and their dependence on the environment in which the arefact
grows up.
It may be argued that there are good reasons to carefully discuss and review the size and function-
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building block be the atom, the molecule, the constituent parts of a micromodule (analoguous to
the internal parts of the biological cell), the micromodule itself (corresponding in functionality
to the biological cell), assemblies of micromodules at the level of organs – or intermediate stages
between these individual granules. Seen from today’s perspective, the basic block of type III
artefacts will probably have to have most of the properties of what is attributed to stem cells of
animals (with or without the ability to cater for its own energy supply): with minor changes in its
own reproduction program it can differentiate into cells for the most diverse requirements of the
body, affording the different abilities for sensory, motor and processing tasks inside the complex
whole of the body. It seems that there will be a natural transition in granule size between the
cell-like basic unit of type III and the larger unit size for type II as we go from types II to III, but
this cannot really be predicted now.
From today’s point of view we see four essential threads of technology research (as opposed
to the indispenable conceptual lines of work mentioned above) that should form the basis for
an integrated research plan and should be pursued both individually and carefully interwoven
to traverse the huge tree of possible individual actions, with (1) being the precondition for the
practical implementation of (2)...(4), not, however, for the theoretical investigation of the latter
three:
1. Molecular Robotics: exploration and design of useful materials and substrates (nanotech-
nology and chemistry) lending themselves to build cells that can be made to meet the
different requirements in the variety of body areas/volumes, e.g. high mechanical stability
(for “bones” and “joints”), ability of energy transformation (for “muscles”), for informa-
tion exchange (“networks of nerves”), information processing (“neuronal assemblies”),
etc. The emphasis should be on materials that have the ability to bridge the gap between
the micro-level and large-scale macroscopic structures.
2. Distributed growable sensors: for distributed areas of sensing “cells” that are sensitive to
different physical modalities (force, light, odour, temperature), it will be necessary to in-
vestigate how they can be coordinated and produce sensible results when they are located
over large areas of the outer surface of the body and are physically connected together
through a medium (i.e. the body) that shows a high degree of plasticity. Of equal impor-
tance is the exploration of the role of preprocessing sensor data, either directly in the sensor
(such as the preprocessing taking place on our retina), over pre-structured nerve channels
(such as the visual chiasm) or the early processing stages in the cortex – i.e. why/how these
predetermined structures have evolved in the phylogenesis of creatures and to what extent
it makes sense to mimicked this concept in the artefact.
3. Growable distributed information processing: this is a most demanding research area be-
cause the information processing system must control the growing artefact from the ﬁrst
moment of its “inception” on. This implies that it not only has to permanently control the
artefact’s evolving sensors and effectors, it also has to exert control of the interaction with
the environment for exploration and task purposes so as to control its own development –
while it is growing itself in physical size as well as complexity and is to develop cognitive
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not only to achieve a stable learning and growth behaviour of the information system for
body control but also to make the system develop its own new structural skills, e.g. the
emergence of the concept of “memory”.
4. Growable motor entitites and spatially distributed actuators: the actuators must also be
controllable as they develop both their actuation part (the muscle portion) as well as the
support structure (the skeleton/joint portion). Their evolution must be in sync with the size
and mass of the artefact and they must be supported in the artefact body so that mechani-
cal stiffness and stability is achieved along with a maximum of locomotion effectiveness,
energy efﬁciency and durability.
Ideally, it will be possible to formulate – at an appropriately high level of abstraction – principles
of growth (like the competition metaphors for selection of species – but also for the development
of synaptic connections), which govern the growth processes in the artefact, i.e. a straightforward
and easy-to-formulate principle in terms of a target function like entropy maximisation, energy
minimisation, sparseness etc., such as the principles recently discovered for the development of
the different types of neuronal cells by K¨ onig ().
From a technology development view point, we suggest to lay out a plan which initially centers
about the basic building block (BBB) in view of the four aspects above:
• Functional properties: what are the components that the BBB consists of? What is the
minimum amount of functions integrated into one BBB? How can BBBs arranged in such
a way as to form a large area distributed sensor, a distributed actor or passive support
structures, respectively? Would it be possible to retain a certain amount of bodily plastic-
ity/ﬂexibility throughout the entire lifetime of the artefact?
• Technological issues: how can the individual components be realised – and using what
substrate material – including the ubiquitous question of a suitable source of power? Is it
economical to use just one type of BBB that can differentiate into various uses or should
there be more than one class of BBBs?
• Interaction patterns: how can the individual parts interact over different communication
channels, not necessarily only through electrical connections? Studying the interaction
patterns is particularly important because, unlike with nanostructures whose interaction is
completely static (i.e. binding forces), there can be a diverse range of patterns between the
BBBs with different reach, with different time-scales, signal amplitudes, etc. These have
to be clearly deﬁned with respect to achievable plasticity, networking parallelism, scaling
from a few to millions of nodes and further parameters.
In parallel, the development of convincing application scenarios scenaria should be advocated.
This not only pertains to useful deployment on the factory ﬂoor, in private homes, outdoor sup-
portetc., butitalsoinvolvesthetransferofpartsofthetechnologytoapplicationsthatcouldproﬁt
from, say, microscale machinery with integrated sensing and information processing abilities for
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3.4 Expected Results: What will it be good for?
In Table 3.1 we have listed some of the possible applications of spinoff knowledge of potential
research carried out within the framework of Factor-10 for adaptive and growing body structures.
This table presupposes a development line from type II to type III artefacts with parallel basic
research that in the ﬁrst step is targeted at machines with relatively large BBBs using technology
as available today, and then moves on to deﬁne the requirements for microscale BBBs, capitalis-
ing on nanotechnology modules. It may turn out to be more useful to start with the development
of the latter type of BBBs right away, but this will have to be cleared up in a separate step. We
have also listed some of the spin-off applications that may be the result of partial aspects of the
developments. In particular for type III artefacts, the range of applications that one can imagine
is so huge that it would be beyond the scops of this roadmap-contribution to describe them all.
Sufﬁce it to say that given the basic blocks are cheap enough all kinds of “intelligent structures”
of small to large sizes may build themselves and can also change their shape according to various
user needs. However, only the future cann tell if such a vision may come true and if such poten-
tial applications, which are far beyond the current conception and understanding of robotics, are
a desirable addition to our daily life in terms of cost/beneﬁt ratios. On the other hand, it is clear
that the small-size artefacts we shall be enabled to build can most certainly ﬁnally deliver what
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Expected Result Application of the Result and Users
From Research targeted at type II artefacts
Artefactswithearly-cognitivepropertiessuchascon-
text and attention-dependent visual scene analysis
or with human-like pattern of intention-driven be-
haviour.
Applicationsthatrequireonlylow-leveladaptationto
userneeds, e.g. advancedhuman-machineinterfaces.
Adaptive, cooperative prosthetics or physical support
for senses, limbs and a combination thereof.
Handicapped and elderly people.
Artefacts with perception systems that share similar
principles for human use and industrial automation
and possess a high degree of robustness as typical of
biological systems
Medium and small scale production of goods not to
be automated up to now. Revolution of the produc-
tion of variants and a “batch size of one”.
Easily instructible “disappearing” robot systems for
use in service (home and factory ﬂoor) that can adapt
their body structure to become highly task-adaptive
and that have some basic understanding of their own
being there (self-awareness), react to and show emo-
tions etc.
Small production shops and “home-workers”, new
generations of handy “intelligent tools”, more de-
manding cleaning and housekeeping than just auto-
matic vacuum cleaning, simple plumbing tasks, but
also storage (management) of all kinds of objects –
even in small apartments.
From Research targeted at type III artefacts
Artefacts that are capable of mind-body co-evolution
and may adapt over a ﬁnite period of time to arbitrary
enviroments (ultimate goal of the Factor-10 develop-
ments).
Unlimited range of applications. From microscale
(e.g. use inside blood-vessels)to creatures of animal-
like shape up to free-form structures with intelligent
behaviour and distributed sensing (e.g. for house
or road construction purposes) to symbiotic human-
artefacts use (e.g. for increasing stamina, cognitive
skills, etc.).
From Ongoing Basic Research
In-depth understanding of the neural basis of human
sensorimotor and cognitive processes and their de-
velopment, the interaction of sensor/motor skills and
the way mind and body interact during their respec-
tive development.
Researchers can simulate development (e.g. de-
velopment of senses on ﬁxed bodies and/or co-
evolution of mind and body on growing structures)
in a much more realistic way by using artefacts and
test hypotheses on them; depending on the level of
modelling-granularity as a supplement to animal ex-
periments (in the long run possibly leading to a re-
duction of the need to carry out such experiments).
Basic Technologies in the ﬁeld of: materials re-
search, optoelectronics, sensors, actuators, informa-
tion processing, ...
Industrial Automation Companies, Telecommunica-
tion Companies, new companies of still unknown
proﬁle.
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Successful Thinking and Acting in the
Physical World
4.1 Introduction
Peripheral devices as well as the methods (e.g., buses and protocols) used to integrate them into
a system have been important areas of mainstream IT for decades. Strong trends towards em-
bedded IT devices and pervasive computing are likely to increase the importance of periphery
and system integration aspects even more in the future. Since NeuroIT is an approach to im-
proving IT, it needs to address these issues as well. Furthermore, there are substantial arguments
suggesting that these aspects will carry even greater weight in neuroscience-inspired IT than in
mainstream IT. These arguments are based on the nature of NeuroIT’s speciﬁc goals, on the
nature of neural systems and on the principal obstacles which need to be overcome in order to
achieve the goals.
The principal argument for placing emphasis on periphery and system integration arises from
the still elusive reasons for the existence of many sorely-felt performance gaps between natural
neural systems and man-made artifacts. NeuroIT can be seen as an attempt to close these gaps by
learning from nature. If the causes for these gaps were known for certain, closing the gaps would
— at worst — require an incremental improvement in IT capabilities (e.g., more computing
power), but this seems not to be the case. Instead, what seems to be hampering progress is a lack
of operable concepts as to how IT capabilities, especially computing power available today or in
the foreseeable future could be put to use in order to successfully reproduce the wide range of
capabilities seen in natural neural systems. To remedy the situation, a set of working hypotheses
for possible causes is needed.
One such hypothesis (emphasized in the ‘Conscious machines’ grand challenges) is that brains
(in particular, human and non-human primate brains) have computational capabilities for rea-
soning, planning, assigning saliency and priorities, etc., which are vastly superior to man-made
algorithms devised to reproduce these skills. It may therefore be speculated that superior algo-
rithmic/computational capabilities account for the major portions of the capability gaps. While
this is certainly a valid hypothesis worthy of further exploration, it is not the sole possible expla-
nation.
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In fact, when engineering a system intended to perform ‘intelligently’ in the physical world,
designers have a wide variety of possible options. These can be grouped into four classes:
Choice of Computation & Control Strategies plays a large role in determining the perfor-
mance of a system. Depending on the task and circumstances, reasoning, planning, consid-
ered choices of action, or just reactive response to environmental stimuli may be necessary
or sufﬁcient to achieve the designer’s goals.
Choice of Morphology can be signiﬁcant in facilitating or complicating the task of a physical
agent: the right kind of body can be crucial. For example, the body shapes of animals
which live in the spaces between sediment particles (‘interstitial fauna’) are crucial to set-
tling this environment. Likewise, the choice of wheels or legs for locomotion signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences accessibility and traversability of terrain.
Choice of Materials is also crucial in high performance sensory and actuation systems. For
instance, sensing of mechanical waves, like displacement and acceleration detection by
mechanoreceptors or hearing of sound waves is accomplished in large part by the mate-
rials properties of the sensors; the characteristics of animals’ effector systems — speed,
compliance, efﬁciency — are determined by the materials properties of muscles, tendons
and connective tissues.
The Environment itself can also be engineered or exploited to facilitate the system’s perfor-
mance. Examples include making use of the pattern of polarization in light scattered by
the upper atmosphere as a compass sensor, or marking the environment to store naviga-
tional information, such as pheromone trails or with street signs.
An alternative hypothesis is therefore that natural neural systems are superior primarily because
they are better integrated and optimized with respect to all these options. They are deployed in
a system (for example, an animal) where coherent design choices are manifest across the whole
space of options, rather than just at the computational/control level. Hence, the computational
capabilities of the agent are distributed over the central nervous system, the peripheral system,
the materials of the agent’s body and — often overlooked — the physical phenomena created by
the interaction of the agent with its environment. Along these lines, it may be speculated that
many of the tasks which neural systems excel in are not as hard to perform as it seems, if they
are posed in the right fashion. Signiﬁcant reductions in task complexity can be realized if each
component in the control loop solves a simpliﬁed problem while relying on the other components
to create the conditions that make these simplifying assumptions valid (Brooks, 2002). There-
fore, an intelligent, well integrated periphery which exploits the possibilities implicit in all the
dimensions of the design space, may be the a key to lowering task difﬁculty from ‘impossible’
to ‘possible’ or even ‘straightforward’ thereby alleviating the need for more powerful central
algorithms.
Fundamentally, these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Both are most likely part of the
complete explanation of intelligent systems in nature. What remains to be seen is to what extent
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solution. As long as neither can be dismissed as a negligible factor, both hypotheses should be
pursued as grand challenges. While these grand challenges are interrelated and should ultimately
become part of an integrated solution, each of them will probably maintain a distinct emphasis
for the foreseeable future. It is therefore in the interest of maintaining clarity and focus to mark
them as distinct approaches.
One further goal of NeuroIT is to make IT artifacts sufﬁciently intelligent that they can interact
with humans in a natural way (s. ‘Conscious machines’ grand challenges) or interface success-
fully with the human brain as a useful replacement (prosthesis) or extension (s. ‘Brain interface’
grand challenge). In either case, adequate periphery will be of prime importance, because it will
be a determining factor in how humans will perceive the artifacts and hence judge their impact
on the quality of life. For example, it is very likely that a robot which looks like a ‘trash can
on wheels’ (as iRobot’s B21r and similar designs) will be perceived by humans primarily as a
‘trash can on wheels’, no matter what computational skills it is endowed with. As a matter of
fact, this issue goes beyond human perception, since an intelligent artiﬁcial being embodied in a
trash can on wheels will indeed have great difﬁculty to be a part of human life, because it lacks
the physical capabilities to do many of the things that humans can do (e.g., climb stairs, sit down
at a table). A generalized version of the latter aspect, namely being able to perform useful func-
tions in the human environment or any environment into which there is a scientiﬁc or economic
interest is not limited to natural interaction with humans. It is likely that NeuroIT artifacts can be
perceived as useful and hence gain wide acceptance in society, if they perform useful services,
many of which will not require them to interact with humans in the way one human interacts with
another. Design of NeuroIT artifacts for such purposes may hence turn to the vast knowledge
pool made up by the designs of the millions of non-human neural systems found in nature.
4.2 Objectives
The objective of the ‘Successful thinking and acting in the physical world’ challenge is to build
completesystemswhichmakeoptimumuseofdistributedintelligenceembeddedintheperiphery
(sensors, actuators, body morphology and materials) and at a system integration level. Research
on this grand challenge will emphasize
• intelligent periphery
• system integration
• morphology and materials
• inspiration from the wide range of intelligent adaptations in non-human (neural) systems
• gathering and exploiting knowledge about the world and the tasks
• ‘environment models’ used to codify world/task knowledge
Distributed, embedded intelligence should enable the artifacts to master tasks known to be per-
formed by natural (neural) systems but currently elusive to technological reproduction. It should32 CHAPTER 4. SUCCESSFUL IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD
havea signiﬁcant effecton central neural computations taking them to until nowunattained levels
of efﬁciency. Despite neural processing remaining an integral part, the focus of this grand chal-
lenge is on making the periphery smarter and integrating it better with central computations, so
that the whole system gets more powerful and efﬁcient. In addition, knowledge about the tasks to
be performed and the world that they are to be performed in should be integrated at every stage.
Efﬁcient ways to distribute the storage of this knowledge, i.e. ‘environment models’, over the
different subsystems should be developed. Ultimately, it should be possible for designers to have
conﬁdence that each part of such a system exploits all reasonable available prior knowledge. The
same should be true for the system integration level. This calls for advanced methodological
achievements in gathering the relevant knowledge. Optimization processes in nature operates on
large time-scales and vast numbers of prototypes for testing. In order to apply such optimization
to every part, every integration level and every task, shortcuts need to be found which narrow the
search space so that it can be managed within the scope of a engineering design process.
In following the outlined approach and addressing the involved issues, research on this grand
challenge will produce novel, smart peripheral devices for NeuroIT systems and thereby promote
the pervasive use of intelligent robotic systems. While individual projects will probably have to
include many case studies, work on the grand challenge as a whole should establish general
rules, how these objectives can be achieved for any tractable problem. Obtaining a set of design
rules will enable tailoring solutions to IT problems without further need to study speciﬁc natural
solutions. Consequently, the design rules may be applied even to problems for which no solution
is known to exist in nature.
Research results should lead to the creation of universal standards (e.g., ‘bus standards’) for
smart NeuroIT peripherals, which would enable closer cooperation between research projects
(parts developed in one project can be reused by another) and also facilitate the inclusion of
novel technology into product design. A pool of smart, readily available periphery should not
only provide the building blocks for powerful individual systems (robots) but also establish new
capabilities for robot interaction and collaborative behaviors, either between self-contained indi-
viduals or parts forming ‘states’ or super-organisms.
4.3 Examples
• Distributing intelligence over both central and peripheral stages should enable construction
of parsimonious, ‘minimalist’ solutions and thereby pave the way for building cheap, low
power and yet very capable robotic artifacts. Such systems should reproduce the perfor-
mance of biological systems (in sensing, control, actuation and particular combinations of
these) with the computing power of standard embedded systems.
Such artifacts could — for instance — be made so ubiquitous that they could coexist with
humans in symbiotic human-robot ecologies in which they would enhance the quality of
human life. This would not necessarily require the artifacts to be capable of ‘social in-
teraction’ with humans, but they could rather maintain human environment quality in a
pervasive, yet unobtrusive manner. One may envisage that the organisms adopt behavioral
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ple, mice, cockroaches, geckos), but perform useful services to humans. Such symbiotic
ecologies could be established in a variety of contexts, for example:
smart home ecologies: Humans share their homes with unobtrusive creatures, which,
for example, keep the house clean (not only carpets, for which there is prior art, but any
surface that needs care, like bath/kitchen tiles, kitchen sink and plumbing, clean and iron
clothes hanging in the wardrobe, etc.), establish and adapt wireless communication infras-
tructures (between household appliances as well as with the outside, smart teleconferenc-
ing equipment) and are rewarded with access to power.
public spaces ecology: Perform cleaning of ﬂoors and windows, remove litter. Maintain
and repair wall/roof surfaces, perform, for example, intelligent grafﬁti removal.
ofﬁce ecologies: Establish and continuously adapt communication/teleconferencing se-
tups, perform smart retrieval of tools and optimize the conﬁguration of workspaces, ofﬁce
desks and storage.
hospital/emergency room ecologies: Optimize sensors to monitor patients’ health, fault
detection, provide better comfort by reacting to symptoms of patients’ discomfort with
changes of environment (for example, temperature, lightning, humidity, noise cancella-
tion and music), adapt the environment to be best suited to patterns of emergencies, for
example, diagnostic equipment which optimizes its diagnostic skills.
communication ecologies: Optimize — in particular wireless — communication chan-
nels to maximize transmission quality, efﬁciently share resources, minimize power con-
sumption in order to increase battery life and decrease EMI health and safety risks. An
example for EMI related safety risks would be interference with navigation or other vi-
tal systems. Future wireless communication devices carried by passengers on an airplane
could intelligently adapt to the navigation/communication needs of the airplane, granting
them absolute priority automatically and removing the need for absolute restrictions on
their use and enforcement of these restrictions.
security ecologies: Perform and optimize monitoring and surveillance tasks, optimize
sensor conﬁgurations and communication links according to current sensing conditions or
patterns of security breaches or vandalism. For example, instead of installing surveillance
cameras at ﬁxed locations, they could be mounted on agile NeuroIT artifacts, which can
continuously adjust position and orient them to maximize image quality under changing
lighting conditions or in response to noises. If these agents are sufﬁciently agile, they could
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playground ecologies: Enhance the value of recreational facilities for both children and
adults by making them more entertaining, more likely to practice valuable skills and also
safer by reducing the probability of accidents. For example, slides and swings could keep
track of acceleration forces and make adjustments to dampen excessive accelerations.
• The study of simple ‘organisms’, both natural and man-made, that allow detailed analysis
of their entire neural system, i.e. periphery and CNS, while performing natural tasks in
challenging, natural environments or faithful laboratory reproduction thereof.
• The study of non-human and possibly ‘super-human’ senses and actuation principles found
in nature, in order to lay the foundation for artifacts which can not only replace human
labor but also extend human capabilities, for instance to enable successful living in hostile
environments.
• The study of how ‘environment models’, i.e., ﬁnding the minimal amount of information
necessary to get around intelligently in the environment, allow different organisms to in-
tegrate their peripheral and central processing into a control loop that efﬁciently guides
them through their environment. Starting from simple organisms should allow to study the
evolution of gradually more complex models.
4.4 Current state of technology
The periphery and system integration of current NeuroIT artifacts is in general still woefully
inadequate and lagging behind natural systems. There are many examples where this is signif-
icantly hampering technology. For instance, in autonomous driving the limited dynamic range
of cameras makes it impossible for these systems to cope with the same range of situations as
human drivers (for example, driving through a tunnel). In the same context, clever use of eye
movements has been employed already to improve performance in negotiating curves and inter-
sections (Dickmanns, 2002).
The physical embodiment of most experimental/research systems is either inadequate for inter-
esting tasks (for example, trash cans on wheels) or too conventional (RC car or RC airplane) to
yield signiﬁcant advances in understanding or performance. Researchers in the ﬁeld need ready
access to much better embodiments or components for tailoring their own embodiments accord-
ing to their speciﬁc needs. Projects in the life-like perception systems initiative, like Bioloch,
Cicada, Circe, Cyberhand have been doing exploratory work on smart periphery and addressing
the system integration challenge. This grand challenge should serve to turn NeuroIT periphery
into a widely used, mainstream technology at ﬁrst for research purposes and later for the mass
market. In doing so, it will push the limits of what such periphery and integration schemes can
do and what NeuroIT researchers whose main research goals are not periphery itself can do using
it.
In the ﬁeld of natural scene statistics, ways to obtain and utilize probabilistic knowledge about
the environment have been explored already. This kind of work needs to be taken to a new level
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Projects like the DARPA-funded ‘smart dust’ project have been addressing the issue of deploying
many cheap sensor modules. However, most research efforts seems to been directed mainly
towards the networking and mass-manufacturing aspects, the smart dust grains themselves could
be a lot smarter (and yet remain cost-effective to produce).
Despite the extensive research that has been conducted in the cognitive sciences into how space is
represented by brains (Paillard, 1991) very few concepts have emerged which have been success-
fully applied to artiﬁcial systems. Hence, independent from this line of research, mobile robotics
has investigated representations of the environment that allow autonomous systems to perform
useful tasks in natural, unstructured environments. However, in particular, outdoor mobile robot
applications are increasingly based on the use of GPS instead of environment models, restricting
their application to environments where GPS-like information is readily available and making
such applications less likely to become good models of natural systems.
Subsumption-based architectures (Mataric, 1992; Brooks, 1986), have paid special attention to
the distribution of ‘environment models’ over the different subsystems necessary to control an
artiﬁcial agent. This approach however, is only loosely based on living organisms and not on a
systematic study of principles gleaned from control in natural systems.
4.5 Problem areas
• Find ways to mass-manufacture and assemble the parts of advanced NeuroIT devices. For
small structures, MEMS technology may be a solution, but many structures will have to be
larger in order to perform the intended functions. Rapid prototyping technologies should
be looked at in the context of using materials and creating shapes particularly well suited
for NeuroIT artifacts.
• Find ways to analyze an organism’s (natural or biomimetic) neural system while executing
natural tasks in a natural, unstructured environment.
• Characterizeandanalyzethemostlyunexploredphysicsdescribingtheinteractionbetween
the organism’s sensors/actuators, body and the environment during the execution of a nat-
ural task.
• Improve understanding of the trade-offs between the different kinds of design choice avail-
able, as a function of task, environment, cost and technology, and ﬁnd ways to support
rational design of the complete system.
• Develop novel sensor and actuator technology to support the smart, biology-inspired, pe-
ripheral systems.
• Application of non-linear dynamic systems theory for analysis of interaction organism and
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4.6 Future activities
A systematic effort should be undertaken to facilitate the development of next-generation Neu-
roIT periphery. Today, embodiments for research systems can be obtained from — typically
small — companies which cater for the needs of experimental robots. Because they are limited to
small markets, these companies lack the resources for bold innovation and consequently their de-
signs are very conservative and leave a lot to be desired in terms of capabilities and performance.
Alternatively, such embodiments are developed in research labs as one-of-a-kind systems which
take a lot of man-power to develop but often enjoy very limited use beyond the scope of the
research project they originated in. Remedies for this situation should be systematically worked
on in order to give researchers access to peripheral modules and system integration frameworks
with capabilities and performance levels which go far beyond what is generally available to them
today. At the same time, technology and markets should be developed in the research stage al-
ready in order to pave the way for the development of NeuroIT devices for the mass-market. The
activities necessary to achieve these goals include:
• Develop benchmarking standards to stimulate and monitor the improvements of NeuroIT
systems. This could take the form of a broader set of ‘Turing tests’ for NeuroIT systems,
which perform tasks other than armchair conversation with humans. For instance, artifacts
could be tested by making them interact and speciﬁcally compete with the biological sys-
tems they are meant to reproduce. For example, a robotic ﬂy could chase natural ﬂies, a
robotic tuna could capture natural squid successfully, ...
• Developandstandardizegeneral, ﬂexibleprotocolsforinterfacingNeuroITperiphery, both
physically and in terms of data communication in order to foster exchange of modules
between researchers and prepare the ground for industry standards needed for the future
commercial use of NeuroIT devices.
• Organize an ‘organ donor data base’ for NeuroIT components (periphery as well as com-
putation and control modules) to facilitate the exchange and reuse of existing periphery
by researchers. Speciﬁcations for bus and protocol standards as well as benchmark scores
will be registered in this data base and will form the basis for making a match between
requests and offers.
• Establish a repository (‘Noah’s ark’) of reference implementations, where information
about periphery modules and system integration frameworks is stored along with a physi-
cal prototype, which is available to researchers on loan for testing/evaluation purposes. For
from systems from EU-sponsored projects, entry of the results into the repository could be
made mandatory, for other research, strategies should be developed for providing incen-
tives for providing information about systems as a physical reference prototype.
• Establish shared manufacturing facilities (probably by way of cooperation with indus-
trial partners) which make manufacturing technology speciﬁcally developed or adopted
for building next generation NeuroIT periphery available to the entire research community
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4.7 Ethical considerations
Deploying capable, pervasive NeuroIT system within human society poses risks of failure and
misuse. While possibly not urgent in the basic research stage, ultimately strategies will have
to be developed to make such systems failsafe and limit the opportunities for misuse. Suitable
conceptsfortacklingtheseissuesmayagainbeinspiredbynature, lookingatnaturalmechanisms
for fault detection and repair.
AdequateNeuroITperipherymaybearemedyforethicalobligationstowardsconsciousartifacts:
Such artiﬁcial beings should not be placed in bodies ‘handicapped’ by insufﬁcient periphery, if
they are aware of and capable of suffering from these handicaps.38 CHAPTER 4. SUCCESSFUL IN THE PHYSICAL WORLDChapter 5
Conscious machines I
5.1 Motivation and objective
The quality of the mechanical components of robots, the available sensors, and in particular
computing power have increased over the past few years to an extent that today a large number
of new tasks can be processed in the ﬁeld of ”service robotics”: e.g. materials and tools transport
in factories, delivery services in hospitals, household cleaning chores, or underwater inspections.
However, the hopes placed in this new class of robots have not been fulﬁlled. Their acceptance
falls far short of the original euphoric expectations. There are two main reasons for this:
• The adaptation of robots of this kind to tasks that deviate only slightly from their original
functions is very difﬁcult and in many cases has to be carried out by the manufacturer. This
also applies to changes in the environment in which the robots work.
• Communication and cooperation with human beings on a given task is largely an unsolved
problem.
Both of these things result in people perceiving these robots as being thoroughly ”dumb” and,
worse yet, their services are in many cases not yet seen as being a help. This will only change
if and when the fundamental deﬁcit shown by today’s robots, i.e. their lack of autonomy and
adaptivity, is eliminated.
Flexibility of an artiﬁcial being (artifact) with regard to structurally changing tasks presupposes
cognitive functions, i.e. recognition of objects and environment, planning and control of move-
ments and actions, learning of object characteristics and long action sequences (with sensorimo-
tor parameters), transfer of generalizations to new situations, evaluation of situational contexts,
generalization and transfer of knowledge learned under speciﬁc contextual or environmental con-
ditions to new situations, independent development of autonomous behavior based on experience
and background knowledge (analogous to the transfer of learned actions to the human cerebel-
lum), short-term and long-term memory.
On the other hand, a key prerequisite is the adaptation of body and effector mechanisms to the en-
vironment. Theirbehavioralequipmentshouldmakeitpossibleforartifactstoworkinsemistruc-
tured environments of the kind in which human beings move quite naturally, e.g. homes, public
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institutions, factories, powerplants. Inaddition, physicaladaptabilityistheprerequisiteforbeing
able to assume tasks which human beings cannot handle or only with considerable technical dif-
ﬁculty, such as in environments hostile to life, based on independent development of appropriate
survival strategies. There are two possibilities for adaptation: either the use of self-organization
and growth processes (in the sense of an independent adaptive strategy only ”genetically pre-
determined” by the designer which is based on the constraints dictated by the environment and
appropriately assesses the success of adaptation) or the adaptation of mechanics using additional
devices or tools. The ﬁrst possibility corresponds to biological evolution over thousands of years;
thesecondrequiresthepassing onofknowledgebased onexperienceregardingtheuseofdevices
from one ”generation” to the next. After all, it is conceivablethat artifactscould be equipped with
redundant effector mechanisms whose use would improve through practice (through additional
availability of resources; this would correspond to the enlargement of areas of the brain used to
control frequently used limbs). The development of adequate social and interactive communica-
tion between artifacts and humans requires (i) the bidirectional use of all modalities available to
human beings (optical, visual, linguistic, auditive, gesticular, mimical) and (ii) the ability of the
artifact to predict movement, action, and communication sequences. The ﬁrst point requires, in
addition to the recognition and production of expressions in all modalities, also the recognition
and pursuit of human dialogue patterns – an extremely difﬁcult problem. The second point is the
prerequisite of insightful behavior. On presentation of a task the various options for completing
the task are gone through mentally and the best option is implemented in action. Only a few
living beings (humans and humanoid apes) are able to do this, but it is an indispensable demand
to be placed on artifacts if they are to be taken seriously by humans as interactive partners.
5.2 Questions
In working to create artiﬁcial beings with fundamentally new abilities for afferent adaptation to
environmental conditions in the broadest sense of the term and also with a new quality of cog-
nitive ability with regard to environmental perception and learning, cooperation and interaction
with humans and their own kind, two intertwined problem areas emerge: development of the
perceptual and cognitive apparatus and development of a sense of body.
The following fundamental questions, among others, are connected with the problem of control-
ling the sensorial system and its independent further development:
• What knowledge should be initially ”planted” in the artifact; what knowledge, what be-
havioral patterns, and what structures will it learn on the basis of sensorial input; ﬁrst and
foremost, however, in what way (what is context-dependent, what is dependent on prior
knowledge, what instincts exist)?
• What does the artiﬁcial being know about itself (form, condition, behavior, desires, inten-
tions, assumptions, abilities) and its environment; what does the designer need to know?
• What strategies does it have for exploring the environment (its own interaction with it) and
how can knowledge be constructed through active behavior (looking for food, curiosity,
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• What information can be derived from internal knowledge, for what information is (addi-
tional) sensorial input required, and how will this be evaluated in the light of background
experience and behavioral results; what will be transferred to memory?
• How can representations be built up which will be appropriate to the extendable depiction
of internal knowledge of the external world and of one’s own competence and in this
context include factors such as space, time, and internal state?
• How are ideas and concepts as those developed by humans learned, how do meanings
arise, and how are they connected with sensorial and behavioral patterns. Based on the
human use of concepts can independent conclusions be drawn for their use or for one’s
own behavior?
• How can humans gain access to the experience of the artifact, which is accumulated in the
same world as human experience, but is doubtless different? What experience will both
sides gather in the process of interacting with one another?
• In the end will there be the possibility that operations on these (or higher) representations
will create a separate (ego-)awareness?
Further complex problems are associated with the problem of the development of corporeality,
the adaptation of behavioral capabilities to suit the environment, and changes made to the envi-
ronment by the artifact:
• To what extent is physical structure responsible for the sequence of cognitive processes or
for their development?
• Is it possible to learn from the evolution of natural examples of sensors and their excellent
adaptation to task niches (what factors are adaptable, what can be changed and what not)?
• How are representations created and how do they interact with the robot structure?
• How can these representations be used to support behavioral planning through trial actions,
taking into account one’s own dynamic behavior, through anticipatory inclusion of sensory
patterns (behavior of other systems), and through the use of experience derived from other
contexts?
• How can devices and tools used by humans also be used in a purposeful way by artifacts
(e.g. through observation of human interaction with them and corresponding abstraction
of these observations)?
• To what extent can actors be adapted to new tasks through simple mechanical modiﬁca-
tions? How will these modiﬁed actors be controlled, how are their sensorimotor systems
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• As a result of new (biological) substrates, will the possibility ultimately exist for ”organs”
and ”effectors” to develop through growth (in harmony with cognitive abilities) during the
lifetime of the being?
Expressed more generally, does the question arise as to what a generic architecture may look like
for an autonomous system that develops its own cognitive structures as far as possible, builds up a
knowledge base (intelligible only to itself) through interaction with its environment (humans) as
well as through modiﬁcation/design of its effectors and, as such, is capable of machine cognition
(in contrast to pure learning) and of developing new and non-preprogrammed behavior patterns.
5.3 Method
An operational system is indispensable as a basis on which to study these phenomena, i.e. there is
a need to develop beyond software at least a rudimentary platform made up of existing mechani-
cal subsystems and/or to develop appropriate components (a simulation will not get us anywhere
here). These platforms made up of sensorial and effector mechanisms must be able to register
the environment in its complexity (leading to very complex sensorimotor patterns) and they must
make possible far-reaching actions or behavioral sequences to inﬂuence the environment. Di-
rectly connected with this is the challenge of purposeful organization and control of available
resources (this will not involve a central control unit but rather several ﬁnely or roughly attuned
parallel systems) and their programming, a task that it will hardly be possible to confront with
the programming techniques used in today’s robotics.
What will be involved, thus, is carrying out systematic studies to analyze the principles of action
of biological systems at the signal-processing and conceptualization level with a view to their
transferability to the cognitive and behavioral activities of artifacts. This regards in particular:
1. The co-evolution of sensory systems, cognitive activities, and effector capabilities dur-
ing the lifetime of the artiﬁcial being and/or an inheritance component (corresponding to
chemo-evolution, bio-evolution, and psycho-evolution in living beings).
2. The control and/or use of growth dynamics of the sensorial system and external structures
(morphology). Instead of full coding (speciﬁcation) of the development and/or growth pro-
cess, only a certain disposition is to be given and, as such, principles of self-organization
exploited (in a function-optimizing sense, not with a view to bringing forth entirely new
forms).
3. The creation of a cognitive basis for the learning of structures in different contexts: forma-
tion of categories, concept learning, object naming (e.g., through imitation), and transfor-
mation of knowledge in a form intelligible to humans.
4. The development of suitable substrates/materials and implementation technologies (hard-
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5. The structural coupling of artifacts with the environment as well as their coupling with
humans and/or other machines through social and communicative interaction and through
suitable dynamic ontologies.
For this reason we no longer speak of robots, but rather consider it more appropriate to refer to
these artiﬁcial beings as ”biomachines”, thus emphasizing the aspects of cognitive complexity,
adaptability, and employed principles of action.
5.4 Applications and transfer: market objective
Although the studies we aim to carry out are for the most part very fundamental in character
(involving a very high percentage of theory), it can be assumed that there will be a rapid transfer
to practical applications. The developmental state of hardware platforms is already quite high
(wheeled mobile robots, insectoids, humanoids, special designs), and most of them will be able
to proﬁt from the technologies to be made available here.
Nonetheless, transfer is to be strongly pursued in the framework of this program. The practi-
cal implications of the use of technologies is to be determined early on together with potential
users and studied with a view to their marketability. In cooperation with companies who are
to carry out the marketing activities (and which can of course be founded in the framework of
the program) it will be determined what industrial conditions need to be complied with (safety,
reliability, costs, etc.) and in what (software) form the results are to be presented so that they will
have commercial value.
After an initial phase in which scenarios are deﬁned (experience shows that this is one of the most
difﬁcult phases in a research program of this kind) deliverables are systematically deﬁned for
time intervals of 3 to 4 years on the basis of which method-related progress can be documented
and which hold out promise of immediate beneﬁt for the further development of existing product
lines. They will be built directly on existing platforms and/or components and will follow the
principles of modular design with a view to achieving effective reusability. From the current
viewpoint there are at least three market segments that would be of relevance here:
1. Improvement of classical applications. Involved here are the areas of industrial robotics
(improvement of programming interfaces through the integration of images and language;
learning of complex action sequences, e.g. in factory assembly), driverless transport sys-
tems (simpliﬁcation of task speciﬁcation), prosthetics (adaptation to variable environmen-
tal conditions), etc. The usefulness here is obvious. The primary problem in marketing
will be the attractive implementation of laboratory prototypes in components which man-
ufacturers will actually accept.
2. Complex new tasks in the ﬁeld of adaptive service robotics. Here we will seek to provide
practical demonstrations of the potentials held out by these technologies by applying them
in new areas without an immediate view to marketing. We intend ﬁrst of all to implement
the airport scenario we proposed. A navigation-capable artiﬁcial porter at a large airport
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PanAm ﬂight to San Francisco”) and then follow the passenger to the designated destina-
tion in constant adaptation of its behavior. After that the requirements will be expanded
for our supermarket scenario: a traveling ”sales guide” in a large supermarket will register
what a customer wants to buy and lead the customer (i.e. observing the customer at all
times, walking speed, desire to stop and look) to the point where the customer can ﬁnd the
product he or she wants and also, if needed, provide further information on the product,
special offers, etc. In a second phase it will also be able to take the product from the shelf
(e.g. take it from the bottom shelf for elderly customers), something which will necessarily
require independent adaptation and constant further development of behavioral capabili-
ties given the differences in product categories and their constantly changing locations. In
this scenario almost all the above-named questions regarding the development of cogni-
tive and behavioral systems can be dealt with in a manageable and, most importantly, in
a manner that lends itself to practical demonstration and with thoroughly realistic chances
of attracting public attention and a large market.
3. Edutainment. Over the long term we see the greatest need (although over the short term not
the biggest market) in the ﬁeld of ”edutainment”. In recent years there has been an increas-
ingly strong trend towards an interlacing of the areas of education, continuing education,
applications research, and technology development in the sense of communication of re-
search and development results through ”hands-on” displays or products. This is perhaps
most visible in the toy market. Even big-name institutions such as MIT do not shy away
from supplying product ideas in this area. BioMachines could assume three new tasks
in this connection. First of all they could be part of a larger scenario which humans are
to be made to understand (e.g. as animated displays in science centers and theme parks).
They could be interactive partners for humans (e.g. as toys, in the ﬁlm industry, or in the-
ater). Finally, they could explain and demonstrate their own developmental principles, i.e.
be both subject and object to themselves and, in doing so, attain a degree of interactivity
which software on a computer could never achieve (e.g. virtual beings to illustrate teaching
material).Chapter 6
Conscious machines II
Riccardo Manzotti, Vincenzo Tagliasco e Giulio Sandini LIRA-Lab - University of Genova -
Italy
6.1 Introduction
In the last ten years several studies have approached the topic of consciousness from a scientiﬁc
point of view (Tani, 1998; Jennings, 2000; Buttazzo, 2001; O’ Regan & Noe, 2001; Ziemke,
2001; Zlatev, 2001; Perruchet & Vinter, 2002; Rees & G. Kreiman, 2002; Taylor, 2002; Crick
& Koch, 2003; Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; Harnad, 2003; Zeki, 2003). The Tucson Confer-
ences ’Towards a Science of Consciousness’ (1996-2002) have helped to create the scientiﬁc
environment for the study of consciousness, playing a role similar to that played by the Macy
Conferences on Cybernetics (1946-1953), that prepared the ground for cybernetics and artiﬁcial
intelligence in the following years.
Numerous approaches are emerging to unravel the study of consciousness. Among them there
are a neuroscience approach and a constructivist approach. The ﬁrst was summarized in a Nature
Neuroscience editorial: ’By combining psychophysics, neuro-imaging and electrophysiology,
it will eventually be possible to understand the computations that occur between sensory input
and motor output, and to pinpoint the differences between cases where a stimulus is consciously
perceived and those where it is not’ (Jennings, 2000). The constructivist approach was sketched
by Edelmann and Tononi in their book: ’To understand the mental we may have to invent further
ways of looking at brains. We may even have to synthesize artifacts resembling brains connected
to bodily functions in order fully to understand those processes. Although the day when we shall
be able to create such a conscious artifacts is far off we may have to make them before we deeply
understand the processes of thought itself.’ (Edelman & Tononi, 2000). The realization that the
study of consciousness may require a physical realization is deeper than just being the ’existence
proof’ of a theory because the subjective experience that we intuitively deﬁne as consciousness
requires, by deﬁnition, the existence of a subject and, unless we refer to spiritual entities, a
subject has to have a physical instantiation. ’Pure consciousness’ similarly to ’pure intelligence’
(in the sense of not being contaminated by physical matter such as ﬂesh or silicon) is just a
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philosophical paradox. Therefore a scientiﬁc approach to the study of consciousness must be
based on physical systems and have as a ﬁnal goal the construction of conscious machines.
6.2 Objective
A conscious machine is an intelligent machine (in the intuitive sense of the word) that is aware
of its existence in the world. A conscious machine has emotions, survival drive, motivations,
can decide to be selﬁsh or altruistic, has a drive to learn and ’grow’. A new generation of
autonomous machine will be the result of our deepening understanding of what gives rise to
conscious experience in mammals. For example self-awareness is a crucial tool to ﬁlter-out
irrelevant sensory information. The decision of what is relevant pertains mainly to the goals and
motivations of the perceiving subject and only marginally on the contents of visual information.
Furthermore assigning a ’subjective meaning’ to a physical event is a very powerful way of
reducing the complexity of the sensory and motor information representing such event or of
deﬁning the appropriate level of detail required.
Another case in which consciousness seems to be relevant is during learning. It is well known
that each activity passes through a series of phases and that, at the beginning learning needs a
lot of conscious activity. A dancer needs to train himself/herself consciously in order to move
according to certain rules before being able to acquire the necessary and mostly unconscious
automatic sensory/motor coordination. A conscious machine must possess the same capability
of self teaching.
Finally, the issue of epigenesist and/or development must be addressed. Current machines have
to be carefully programmed in order to accomplish their tasks. From what we know brains of
mammals possess the capability of self organizing themselves in response to external sensory
stimulations. Their structure is far too complex to be completely genetically coded. Further-
more, the behavioral plasticity of mammals is increased immensely by their being able to de-
velop individual unique cognitive capacities. It can be argued that this behavioral plasticity and
consciousness emerged together as a result of a common architectural foundation. If this were to
be demonstrated, a conscious machine would develop uniquely as a result of its own epigenetic
development in a given environment.
Consciousness refers explicitly to the notion of being there or the sense of the self which, in turn,
refers to the understanding of phenomenal experience (Aleksander, 2001). Scientiﬁc hypotheses
about the nature of subjectivity and the physical condition necessary to its emergence can be
advanced (Chalmers, 1996; Damasio, 1999; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Crick & Koch, 2003;
Gallese & Metzinger, 2003). This is unavoidable if we want to deal scientiﬁcally and practically
with consciousness. An attempt to deal with consciousness must challenge these concepts by
providing a unitary framework in which these terms can be used. A theory of consciousness has
to be formulated as a working background at the beginning of the projects (a tentative theory
of meaning and intentionality). A theory for consciousness must provide a series of hypotheses
in order to bridge the gap between cognitive systems and physical systems. These hypotheses
must propose a candidate structure as the structure responsible for the occurrence of phenomenal
consciousness, access consciousness and self consciousness. They must provide necessary and
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This theory must propose a structural difference that will be used to test whether an artiﬁcial
system actually hosts the emergence of consciousness. Therefore, the success of such a theory
will be evaluated by checking its capability of expressing cognitive and mental jargon in terms
of objective structural conditions (like sensory-motor loops, causal relation between experiential
events and subsequent system development).
On the other hand, a scientiﬁc theory of consciousness must be translatable into a series of
experiments and suggestions about how to replicate the physical conditions for the emergence of
phenomenal experience.
6.3 Examples
It is difﬁcult to underestimate the implementation of a conscious machine. The following are a
number of future implementations:
• self organizing agents that develop in different environments and acquire skills and moti-
vations which were not entirely predictable at the time of design;
• epigenetic conscious agents capable of instantiating social relations with their human own-
ers (consequently producing interesting opportunities for the consumer market);
• truly intelligent ’situated artiﬁcial communicators’, e.g. for situation-dependent human
machine interfaces;
• truly ’mentally adaptive’ robot systems with qualitatively new problem solving abilities;
• complex technical systems that can explain their ’state of mind’ to a human user and un-
derstand what he/she feels (communication between different ’kinds of consciousness’).
6.4 Current state of technology
Although the ﬁled of artiﬁcial consciousness is new, a number of projects have sprung up over the
last decades. In 2002-2003, two calls for projects (FET, Future Emergent Technology), ’Beyond
Robotics’ and ’Presence’ from the European Union explicitly encouraged projects in this ﬁeld
by addressing the issue of ’machine consciousness’, ’phenomenal experience in machines and
robots’, and ’machine awareness’. At the same time well-established research projects have con-
tinued to develop in this area. Gerard Edelman’s attempts to build an intentional robot capable of
mimicking the cortical neural structure of the human brain is a noteworthy example (Edelman &
Tononi, 2000). IgorAleksanderhadpresentedmanyresultsinthisarea(Aleksander, 2000,2001).
At the same time many other laboratories have been trying to establish an common engineering
background wherein consciousness can be tackled (McCarthy, 1995; Grossberg, 1999; Manzotti
& Tagliasco, 2001; Perruchet & Vinter, 2002; Taylor, 2002; Haikonen, 2003; Harnad, 2003;
Manzotti & Glatzeder, 2003). Equally interesting for their potential cross fertilization are the
neuro-scientiﬁc approaches to the problem of consciousness (Baars, 1988; Atkinson, Thomas, &
et al., 2000; Cotterill, 2001; O’ Regan & Noe, 2001; Dehaene, 2002; Rees & G. Kreiman, 2002;48 CHAPTER 6. CONSCIOUS MACHINES II
Taylor, 2002; Crick & Koch, 2003; Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; Zeki, 2003). Whether these re-
sults will endorse a robust implementation of a conscious being is still hard to say. However, the
increase in the number of scientiﬁc researchers, explicitly dealing with the design of conscious
machines, bears witness to the emergence of a new ﬁeld of investigation within the scientiﬁc
community.
6.5 Problem areas
A few problem areas of main interest can be envisaged:
• attention control,
• complexity reduction,
• access consciousness,
• phenomenal consciousness,
• self-awareness,
• self generate motivations.
Attention control and complexity reduction are strictly related since an efﬁcient attention system
dramatically decreases the complexity for incoming data by introducing helpful expectations
and selection criteria. On the other hand, complexity reduction is needed in order to grasp those
meaningful unities which can be used to govern attention. Consciousness can be achieved at
different levels. It is customary to distinguish between three different levels of consciousness:
access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and self consciousness (or self awareness).
The distinction between the ﬁrst two is due to Ned Block (Block, 1997). This distinction arises
from the thought that the phenomenal properties of consciousness are of a different character
to the cognitive, intentional or functional properties of consciousness. For Block, the phenom-
enal properties of consciousness are experiential properties. On the other side of the coin, we
have what Block refers to as access consciousness to encapsulate the tasks involved in cogni-
tion, representation and the control of behavior. Finally the last kind of consciousness (self
consciousness) is the most complex one involving the capability of self monitoring mental states
and recognizing them as part of the history and identity of a unique agent. The implementation
of conscious machine can deal separately with each of this kind of consciousness, achieving their
separate realization. Finally it is important to notice that a conscious machine will also be able to
self generate new motivations, new goals to be achieved. In this way a conscious machine should
be able to self teach itself what has to be achieved and also to achieve a much higher degree of
behavioral plasticity. Classic neural network learn how to achieve a task which is given to them
by their designers, conscious machine will learn by themselves what has to be achieved. This ca-
pability should be of great importance for long distance mission (like space exploration) as well
as for long term assignment (as robots left on their own for long period of time in unpredictable
environment as internet, jungles, the bottom of the sea).6.6. FUTURE ACTIVITIES 49
6.6 Future Activities
As it has been mentioned in the previous paragraph the ﬁeld of conscious machines is at the very
beginning of its development; the future activities coincide with the birth of the discipline itself.
6.7 Ethical considerations
Every technical achievement unavoidably entails ethical responsibility and inevitable social pit-
falls: hence the implementation of conscious machines carries a heavy load of ethical responsi-
bilities. Two main concerns are evident:
• ethical problems and responsibilities deriving from the interaction between human beings
and conscious machines;
• ethical problems and responsibilities towards conscious machines as such.
The former issue is relevant and belongs to the broader problem of the introduction of robots and
automaticmachinesinasocialcontext. Althoughtheexistenceofautonomousmachinesisaimed
at achieving a better quality of life for workers and citizens, it has often been seen as potentially
dangerous since it modiﬁes the structure of human work. Besides, conscious machines are seen
as potentially capable of developing their own goals and ends (as has been anticipated by many
science-ﬁction movies) and thus capable, in this respect, of becoming potential competitors for
human beings. The issue of responsibility towards a conscious machine as such is still by and
large theoretical, since no real ’candidate’ is available. However, it is conceivable that such a
candidate would possess at least a phenomenal consciousness of the world in which it is living.
Regards these machines - similar in their degree of subjective development to mammals like
rats, cats, dogs or similar - some kind of ethical rule must be applied. Our understanding of the
ethics of animal experimentation has signiﬁcantly evolved in the last century and by the same
token our attitude towards machines will change as soon as we are able to discern in animals the
existence of some form of consciousness. A ﬁnal issue concerns the fact that the construction of
conscious machines does not necessarily require the use of living biological materials. It follows
that dealing with conscious machines without biological parts many problems could do away
with a number of serious bioethical issues.
6.8 Discussion
The theoretical and philosophical issues concerning conscious machines have been extensively
debated over the past forty years (Dennett, 1969, 1991; Minsky, 1991; Searle, 1992; Chalmers,
1996). However, the technical implementation of conscious machines is still far from being a
certainty; many people still have doubts about its feasibility. Only the attempt to design and
build conscious machines jointly with neuroscience ﬁndings can add new stimuli to an already
mature conceptual framework.50 CHAPTER 6. CONSCIOUS MACHINES IIChapter 7
The ’constructed’ brain
7.1 Introduction
In the ﬁeld of NeuroIT, as it was deﬁned in the introduction, there are at least three major chal-
lenges, which, when taken on, could lead to signifcant advances in technology:
• The interface between the Central Nerve System (CNS) and machine (explained in chapter
2).
• The creation of ’intelligent’ machines: machines that demonstrate ﬂexible behaviour and
that are able to adapt to unforeseen circumstance. And also the creation of a brand of ma-
chines which can be customized easily to tasks outside the original design speciﬁcations,
without requiring a re-design of the machine (see chapter 3 and 6).
• New and better ways to study the brain. If one were able to do ’in silico’ simulation of drug
tests the pharmaceutical industry would be able to design new drugs in a more systematic
way, and, hopefully, in the long run would be able to do without animal (and human)
testing.
• An understanding of the brain itself. A better understanding of brain function will beyond
a doubt have a profound impact on the treatment of psychological disorders, which are a
source of distress to many and also a source of substantial economic damage.
We are stating the obvious when we say that the progress in all these challenges is hampered by
the complexity of the brain. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at the problem of complexity a bit
closer. The way we propose to address this complexity is the basis for the challenge described
in this chapter, and, in our opinion, is essential for progress in the three areas mentioned above.
This complexity has at least two different aspects, a methodological and a sociological aspect:
Methodological aspect:
• The brain is complex in a way that is different from the way that a computer programme or
machine is complex. Unlike machines, or programmes, the brain seems hard to divide into
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modules with a well-deﬁned function or structure. Although it is clear that there is some
relation between brain area and brain function, it becomes increasingly clear that many
aspects of the brain are hard to study in isolation.
• The brain is simply huge, in terms of the number of components and in terms of the phys-
ical and chemical processes that are involved in its functioning. Even if the brain were
simple from an engineering point of view, its size creates a complexity of its own. This is
reﬂected in the number of publications that is produced at the moment and also in size of
data sets of modern experimental techniques.
Sociological aspect:
• There is a large number of disciplines involved in the study of the brain, each with their
own methodology, terminology and traditions. Neuroscience and psychology, for instance,
have long standing research traditions with relatively little interaction. Although the two
are slowly merging into the ﬁeld ’cognitive neuroscience’, there is still a long way to go
before a common terminology and methodology will be developed. In some cases this has
lead to replications of results in one ﬁeld, which have been long known in the other. Often
it also leads to lengthy discussions, which ﬁnd their cause in semantic difference, rather
than fundamental issues.
• Similarly, the application of results from brain sciences are ﬁnding their way into engineer-
ing only slowly. Although there are examples to the contrary, ’bio-inspired’ applications
in engineering or IT often refer to the application of artiﬁcial neural networks. As such,
they are part of a larger set of statistical learning techniques, where a biological and cog-
nitive perspective is absent. Many introductory texts in the ﬁeld of machine learning, or
computer vision ignore recent advances in cognition completely. A better dissemination of
recent ﬁndings in cognitive neuroscience and better ways to access them, would undoubt-
edly be beneﬁcial for the development of truly bio-inspired applications.
The central issue in the difﬁculties in creating ’intelligent’ applications, then, is a lack of insight
in why the brain performs cognitive functions so well and so fast. Is it because the brain is
massively parallel, on a scale that we still have not realized in hardware or software ? Or do
we understand the computational architectures of the brain insufﬁciently, as argued in chapter 8
and below ? Is the fact that the brain is massively parallel sufﬁcient for an efﬁcient performance
of cognitive functions, or is the fact the brain codes information by means of spiking neurons
somehow a crucial factor ?
We need a comprehensive view of the processes that take place in the brain, during the perfor-
mance of cognitive tasks and interaction with the outside world, to answer these questions. And
we need to answer these questions in order to be able to develop engineering principles for bio-
inspired hardware in a systematic way. Using this view, we can decide what cognitive function
we can implement in existing hardware, or what kind of hardware we would need to implement
given cognitive functions. Using this view we can decide if and how we can extend our sensory
capabilities, as described in chapter 2. Moreover, we need an infrastructure that allows people
from various disciplines to work together, to develop a common methodology and that integrates
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7.2 Objectives
We are reaching the point, where we have sufﬁcient computing power to simulate a complete
brain in considerable detail. This may be a human brain, or a smaller one (monkey, cat, insect)
depending on what current computer power allows us. This could be called a ’virtual’ brain, in
analogy to the ’virtual cell’. It is essential to include possibilities to integrate hardware into the
framework (see examples), and the resulting structure might be called the ’incorporated brain’.
Or it might be possible to provide an artefact with the brain simulation, thus creating an ’embod-
ied brain’. The total of possibilities we call the ’constructed brain’.
Therefore we propose to:
• Create a framework that allows a large-scale, coarse simulation of the brain, with sufﬁcient
ﬂexibility to create more detailed simulations locally, where needed, or to increase overall
sophistication when computer power increases.
• Allow for the integration of structural and functional data and simulation algorithms into
the framework, thus creating a repository for data and simulation methods.
7.3 Examples
It is not hard to ﬁnd interesting examples for application of the framework:
• The testing of computational strategies, to see if they can realized within the brain, with
the aim of applying them to hardware later.
• ’In silico’ experiments that would be hard or unethical in living creatures. E.g. effects of
drugs and hormones on cognitive performance come to mind.
• Virtual lesions, to study the consquences of trauma, or the function of a certain brain region
are another possibility.
• Impact of diseases (e.g. Alzheimer’s) and aging on cognitive performance.
• To study where and how artiﬁcial implants should be used. To quote a researcher de-
scribing the implantation of an artiﬁcial retina: ”The problem is not to transmit an image
with high resolution, but to send useful information to the right locations in the CNS.”
(Fernandez, 2003)
7.4 Current state of technology
In this section we will try to summarize the state-of-the-art of the technology which is presently
available to initiate this project. We can not give an exhaustive overview of all tools, databases
etc., which are avialable at present, but we will provide examples which exemplify the state-of-
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7.4.1 Simulation tools
At the neuronal level, there are several simulation packages, e.g, GENESIS
(Bower & Beeman, 1998), NEURON (Hines & Carnevale, 1997), CATACOMB
http://www.compneuro.org/catacomb, to name but a few. ( A good overview
of tools that are available at present can be found at http://www.neuroinf.org (links)).
These packages are powerful and useful tools, which make it possible to set up sophisticated
simulations at the neuronal level. With the exception of CATACOMB, they are very much
’stand-alone’ however: few provisions are made to help these package interface to other
programmes and databases.
A number of publications describe sophisticate algorithms, which are able to simulate large
groups of neurons (e.g., Hansel et al., 1998; Mattia & Giudice, 2000). Unfortunately, many of
the programmes that are used to obtain theoretical results, are not made publicly available with
some exceptions (e.g., SPIKENET (Delorme et al., 1999)) On a higher level, simulation tools
seem to be dominated by neural network simulation packages. For example PDP++ (OReilly &
Munakata, 2000) and SNNS (Zell, 1995) come to mind. In general, these packages seem oriented
towards artiﬁcial intelligence and machine learning, rather than high-level cognitive modelling.
An exception is NSL the Neuron Simulation Language which aims to provide a platform for both
the simulation of ANNs, as well as neuronal simulations
On the whole, it seems that almost all software that is available was written with a very speciﬁc
problem domain in mind. For a large number of speciﬁc problem domains very sophisticated
simulation tools are available. There are some examples of tools which aim for a larger scope,
such as NSL, but if they can deal with the various conceptual levels that this project entails, as
well as provide the necessary computational performance is still undecided. In general, almost
no efforts are made to standardize data formats, coding practices and dissemination of software.
Little or no attention is given to the design of interfaces, which allow different simulation tools
to be used together.
7.4.2 Databases
The number of databases, as well as the variety of data that they contain, which can be found on
the web is astounding. An overview can be found on http://www.neuroinf.org (links).
There are a few databases, which are deﬁned very professionaly, with good use of modern
database techniques, such as COCOMAC (Stephan et al., 2001), which provides extensive infor-
mation on macaque brain connectivity. A website, created by van Essen and coworkers, contains
extensive information on surface based atlasses of human and macaque cortex. An interesting
attempt to create a database that is useful for reanalysis of fMRI data is the fMRIDC (van Horn
et al., 2001) initiative, announced in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Here authors are
invited submit the datasets, which were used to support their publications. Futhermore there are
databases on topics as varied as hippocampus neuron data, ion channels, cortical connections in
cat areas. In general, the quality of databases that are publicly available on the web is poor. The
number of broken links on web pages that refer to these databases is high and the design of most
databases does not conform to the high standards set by e.g. COCOMAC. There is relatively7.4. CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY 55
little effort going on to standardize data format and database design. There are, however, some
efforts to address this problem: NeuroML (Goddard et al., 2001), is an XML extension which
aims to enhance the interoperability of databases, simulations and computational models. Neu-
roML is a relatively recent development and it still must establish itself ﬁrmly. Also it must be
extended to incorporate higher cognitive concepts to become useful in a ’virtual brain’, but it
and its American counterpart BrainML (http://brainml.org) seem to be one of the few
initiatives to look beyond one single problem domain.
7.4.3 Theory
There are numerous papers on the behaviour of individual neurons. One of the best known,
of course is the seminal paper by Hodgkin and Huxley (1952), but by now there are literally
thousands of papers, addresing aspects of morphology, ion channels, receptors, cable theory and
so on. This is an important line of research, which has a large number of participants and which
is very active.
On a somewhat larger scale, important topics in NS modelling and theory are: how does the
cortical code work (e.g. various authors, 2001) (rate coding, precise inter spike times (e.g.,
Maass, 1997). How are Long Term Potentiation and Depression (LTP and LTD) realized and
what role do they play in learning, etc. How do cortical and subcortical structures apply these
mechanisms to produce behaviour ?
Somehow one must ﬁnd ways to incorporate this information in higher-level descriptions of
the brain. It is impossible, now and in the foreseeable future to simulate the billions of brain
cells, and their interconnections, even at a very superﬁcial level. And even if this were possible,
it would be of limited use. One would still have to extract higher-level cognitive information
from the spike trains of these billions of neurons. Similar problems in physics have lead to the
rise of statistical physics, where, for instance, a realistic description of the behaviour of gasses
sometimes requires the inclusion of quantum effects. The challenge is to apply a microscopic
theory which is developped to describe individual particles (or very small systems of particles) to
the vast number of molecules present in macroscopic volumes. The use of statistical techniques
was essential to achieve this.
Techniques of statistical physics are used increasingly often to model the behaviour of large
groups of neurons. The behaviour of large groups of neurons under input is very complex, but
in the last decade signiﬁcant progress has been made on this subject. It was demonstrated con-
vincingly that large groups of neurons (e.g., Amit & Tsodyks, 1991; Gerstner & van Hemmen,
1992; Knight, Manin, & Sirovich, 1996; Omurtag, Knight, & Sirovich, 2000; Eggert & van
Hemmen, 2001), even with the inclusion of some neuronal details (Casti et al., 2002), can be
described by powerful sets of equations. Although the solution of such equations is not trivial, it
is computationally much more efﬁcient than a straightforward simulation of a large group of neu-
rons. These techniques have also been applied to cortical circuits, which are belived to underly
working memory (e.g., Amit & Brunel, 1997), attention, the formation of orientation columns in
visual cortex (Nykamp & Tranchina, 2000), etc.
This is an extremely interesting development, because, ﬁrst, it is possibly an important step to the
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in fMRI allow the identiﬁcation of large-scale functional cortical networks, using techniques
like Structured Equation Modelling , or more recently, Dynamic Causal Modelling. If good de-
scriptions of neural activity for higher-level cognitive processes can be found, it may be possible
to simulate fMRI and EEG signals. Thus, it would be possible to confront models in a very
direct way with experimental data. Secondly, a large number of higher-level cognitive models
is still implemented in terms of ’connectionist’ models. Explanations for coordinate transfor-
mations between various frames of reference (head-centered, eye-centered etc.) (e.g., Zipser
& Andersen, 1988; Pouget & Snyder, 2000) for instance use perceptron networks trained with
’back-propagation’, as are models for attention (e.g.; van der Velde & de Kamps, 2001), models
for long-term memory formation in the hippocampus complex (e.g., Rolls & Treves, 1998). It is
extremely interesting to see how ’connectionist’ concepts can be rooted in neuroscience, because
this is likely to provide constraints for using ’connectionist’ techniques in a biological (and also
cognitive) context (see e.g. Gerstner, 1995; Maass, 1997; de Kamps & van der Velde, 2001).
A ﬁnal important role for theory is the determination of the computational architecture of the
brain. The human cortex is remarkably uniform, and this gives rise to the idea that there is
a relatively small number of cortical conﬁgurations which underly the computational perfor-
mance of the human brain. The idea is that, despite the fact that the human cortex performs an
astounding variety of complex computational tasks, from language processing to visual object
recognition, a relatively small number of computational principles are applied everywhere in the
human cortex. The notion of ’cortical circuits’, for instance, has been around for a while (Dou-
glas, Martin, & Whitteridge, 1989), and theoretical and experimental evidence is mounting that
there are a number of basic cortical circuits which underly cognitive performance. However, also
on a larger scale there appear to be computational architectures in the cortex. It has been argued,
for instance, that the visual cortex is a so-called ’blackboard architecture’ (van der Velde, 1997;
Bullier, 2001): different high-level apects of visual stimuli, such as color, form, motion, etc.,
are processed by high-level visual area. Feedback information from higher to lower visual areas
could lead to a re-evaluation of information in lower visual areas and, for instance, solve bind-
ing questions. The evidence for a ’blackboard architecture’ in the visual cortex is quite strong
and the notion that similar principles could also be involved in the processing and production of
language has been voiced by various researchers.
The investigation of ’computational architectures’ like these is important, becasue it relates to
possible hardware implementations: if there is a small number of ’computational architectures’
in the cortex, and if they are understood, we problably understand how a massively parallel
structure of relatively slow elements is able to perform complex forms of computation. We
would be able to evaluate if we could emulate such a structure in existing or projected hardware,
and if this would lead to an application with the desired performance.
7.4.4 Towards large-scale cortical structures
A few years ago, techniques like PET and fMRI were mainly used to compare activity in brain
areas between two conditions. A cognitive task was performed by the subject, during which
(correlates of) brain activity were measured. Brain activity was also measured during the ’base
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Using eloborate statistical analysis a difference between activity in brain areas between the two
conditions was established, which lead to conclusions of the kind ’area X play a role in cognitive
task Y’. Although important information can be obtained from such analyses, there are obvious
limitations. First of all, it is hard to create ’base line’ conditions, which truly distinguish the state
of mind of the subject performing a task from a ’rest’ state (’try to think of nothing’). Secondly, it
is well-known that some cortical functions (e.g. long-term memory) are distributed over a large
part of the cortex and a localization of function is probably not very meaningful. Thirdly, even
if two brain areas display about the same level of activity between the two conditions (which
means that they are ’subtracted out’ in the comparison between the two conditions), this does
not mean that they do not perform a function in the cognitive task under investigation. Although
the overall level of activity may be the same in the two conditions, the activity may be of a dif-
ferent kind, between the two conditions, as for instance SEM modelling (see below) has shown.
Finally, to see anything at all, sometimes analyses must include several test persons and such
analyses are notoriously difﬁcult, due to person-to-person differences in individual brains. These
disadvantages have made some people sceptical about the use of fMRI and PET research.
There are, however, several recent developments which are extremely interesting from the point
of view of the large-scale structure of the brain. First of all higher magnetic ﬁelds in fMRI scan-
ners and a better understanding of the BOLD effect (which is a correlate of neural activity) have
lead to so-called event related fMRI: responses in individual subjects, caused by single changes
in conditions in the cognitive task that is studied can be observed. Secondly, more sophisticated
analysis methods are used which allow a more subtle use of data than a simple comparison be-
tween two conditions. One of those technique is Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (see (van
Hulle, 2003) and references therein), which does not simply look at the level of activity of a
brain area, but which also takes correlations between brain areas in a single condition in account.
In this way, effective connectivity between brain areas can be established, and correlation be-
tween brain areas can be studied. This has lead to the identiﬁcation of large-scale functional
networks for cognitive tasks, which can supplement structural networks, which can be identiﬁed
in anatomical studies, which are e.g. represented in the work of van Essen of the COCOMAC
database. The implications of the discovery of these networks may be profound. Already it has
been demonstrated that there is difference in these networks between young subjects and old
ones, which is not reﬂected in behavioral measures. These discoveries by themselves are impor-
tant enough. In section 7.6, where we discuss future developments, we would like to point out
the great possibilities that recent developments in this ﬁeld, combined with recent developments
in theory (see section 7.4.3) would offer: for the ﬁrst time ’top-down’ modelling is possible,
where the existence of large-scale functional andeffective cortical networks is given and where
models on a smaller level (cortical circuits, small neural networks) are used to reproduce the
large-scale networks.
Although the techniques discussed here are relatively new and new techniques like Dynamic
Causal Modelling (DCM) (van Hulle, 2003) are still under investigation, already new approaches
to analyze large-scale cortical structures are being considered, such as Bayesian network ap-
proaches (e.g. Neal, 2000). Such approaches, in combination with a good model for the under-
lying neural activity, may prove an important step forwards in constructing an overall model of
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7.4.5 Hardware
There are two possible implementations for this kind of project. A simulation on a large-scale
super computer, including highly networked high perfromance clusters. Or specily designed
chips using Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) techniques. To our knowledge VLSI techniques
have been used for relatively small systems (see (IJspeert & Mange, 2003) for an overview).
There are, however, initiatives to develop VLSI architectures, which have a size and level of
connectivity comparable to the brain (Hammerstrom, 1999).
Large supercomputers are available in national centra throughout Europe. The computational
power of these computer is impressive and still growing. (Some numbers on current supercom-
puters to be inserted here.).
7.5 Problem areas
Many of the problem areas already have been discussed above. We will review them here.
• A true, multidisciplinary overview of ’brain science’ is lacking. ’Brain science’ is still
composed of several traditional disciplines, which have relatively little knowledge of each
other’s work, methodology and terminology.
• Information which is essential for good modelling and theory making is scattered over
thousands of sources, many of them still paper.
• There is little structure in databases which are publicly available. The quality of databses
ranges from unstructured lists of facts to well-designed, professional datastructres. There
is also little consistency: some databases vanish from public view after a while.
• Little use if made of existing techniques to share information between databases or to
construct data models in such a way, that databases can readily interface to each other.
• Similar problems affect simulation tools.
• Simulation tools are not used enough. Substantial progress in theory, for instance, is not
available because it is not cast into software which is publicly available. There is a large of
amount of data, which is well-described and well-established, but which is relatively hard
to obtain. A good comprehensive model that represents everything which is known about a
’cortical column’ or ’cortical circuits’ which is publicly available, in a well-deﬁned format
would be of considerable value.
• Large-scale cortical structures are in the process of being discovered. There is no method-
ology to capture these large-scale strutures, and to structure the data from which they are
inferred. Such a methodology is essential for a future large-scale model of the brain.
• The complexity of issues concerning software is underestimated. Too often programming
is viewed as something that every scientist can do on the side. Software design and imple-
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• New techniques are necessary to visualize the complex data sets, delivered by current
experimental methods. These techniques will probably essential in visualizing a large-
scale model of the brain itself.
Some of the problems above are being addressed by current initiatives. In particular the transmi-
gration of important information from paper to electronic databases is clearly in progress, due to
initiatives like the Human Brain Project. Also, some disciplines slowly start to merge (one might
consider ’cognitive neuroscience’ as the marriage of cognitive psychology and neuroscience).
Overall, howver, the research community still seems very fragmented. Many of the tools that are
being created at the moment are very useful for other researchers in the ﬁeld in which they are
created, but are relatively difﬁcult to use for researchers from another ﬁeld. A modeller, for in-
stance, will certainly appreciate a good brain atlas. If he wants to use the underlying information,
however, it will not do to make this available over a Graphical User Interface (GUI) based web
application. The modeller may want to use the underlying information, that is used to generate
these atlasses, and may want to access this information in hiw own programmes through direct
interaction with a local database. Although, as mentioned above, there are some initiatives that
try to improve the interoperability of various databases and simulation tools, it remains to be
seen if they will ﬁnd wide acceptance. The success of these initiatives will be determined by
the number of supportes and users they will gain. For many research groups there is no strong
incentive to seek multi-disciplinary collaboration, because substantial scientiﬁc progress in their
own ﬁeld is still possible, and as long as this is the prevailing situation, there will be no strong
drive to support initiatives for interoperability.
7.6 Future Activities
7.6.1 A ground plan for the brain
A ﬁrst step would be to make an inventory of hardware which is suitable for a ﬁrst implementa-
tion of a project of this kind. A supercomputer would be the ﬁrst logical choice. A second step
would be to make an inventory of existing techniques and projects which are going in the same
direction as this initiative and to invite them into an organisational structure.
An essential concrete step would be to implement a coarse large-scale brain structure on
the chosen hardware right from the beginning. To initiate such a step, probably a conference
or workshop is necessary, to provide the minimum of coordination, which is required for starting
such a project.
7.6.2 A ’start up’ programme
But clearly, such a step takes time and it is important to start-off immediately. So let us de-
ﬁne a start up programme.It is possible to start with small-scale projects. These projects must
model relatively limited aspects of human cognition, or they must emulate parts of human cog-
nition or motor tasks in hardware (artiﬁcial retina, cochlear implants, robot arms/hands, etc.).
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software libraries. The quality of these libraries should be veriﬁed by independent experts and
these libraries should conform to high standards with respect to quality of code, quality of inter-
faces, documentation, and maintenance. Moreover, they should work on various, pre-assigned
platforms (which could include high-performace computers).
The requirement that models be published, but be cast in a well-designed software library as well,
is a signiﬁcant step forward towards models that are re-usable, either in other (more complicated
!) models, or in hardware implementations. The requirement that hardware have a well-deﬁned
software interface opens interesting possibilities: expensive hardware could be kept locally in a
labarotory set-up, with remote access available via the software interface.
Particular stimulation could be considered for projects which promise synergy: this could be
’model-model’,or ’model-hardware’ combinations that are i) related and ii) use or design a com-
mon sofware interface. Examples: a retinal implant, interfaced with model of early visual pro-
cessing, an artiﬁcial hand, whose sensors are interfaced to a model of sensory-motor cortex,
a model of visual processing interfaced with a model of auditory processing interfaced with a
model for multi-modal representations, etc.
Again, it is emphasized that the most important deliverables of these project should be software
libraries, which would distinguish this ’start up’ project from other funding projects in this area
of research. These software libaries themselves can be an important object of study in a later
stage: how can they be maintained, how can they be set up, in such a way that they can easily
be extended, and cooperate with other projects which have not been conceived yet. This is a
central issue in software engineering in general, but in the context of the ’constructed brain’ an
extra quality enters: as we learn more on how the brain works, some of this insight might make
its way back into our techniques for constructing software which is reliable, fault-tolerant and
’degrades gracefully’.
In parallel the following activities must be undertaken, in order to reﬁne the initial structure in
an iterative way.
• The collection of databases which allow direct access to: neuronal data, small scale brain
structures (e.g, details on the structure of a cortical column), structural and functional con-
nectivity databases, and databases for large-scale cortical structures. We say collection,
because these databases already exist or are being created. The speciﬁc goal of the col-
lection of databases is to provide modellers with the possibility of accessing data at all
levels, directly in one software development. This entails the creation of interoperability
techniques, methods to load parts of large databases into core in a ﬂexible way.
• The creation of of an external environment for the brain to interact with. The environment
in ﬁrst instance would most likely consiste of simulated sensory input and output, which
would corresponds to very simple abstractions of ’real-world’ simulations. In later stages
these abstractions can be extended, and also the environment could be extended to include
’real’ sensory input and motor output. In a later stage, sequences of sensory input and the
consequences of motor actions on sensory input can be considered (’closing the sensori-
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• The development of theoretical methods which bridge the gap between two orders of
magnitude or complexity. Statistical mechnical methods which describe the collective
behaviour of large groups of neurons are one example. The description of cortical circuits
with dynamical models, which capture the essence of more detailed and realistic neuronal
models, for instance the phase space portrait, but which require less computing power to
evaluate. A succesful programme which describes cortical circuits could probably be the
input for a similar programme for higher-level cortical structures.
• Investigation of ’computational architectures’, both from theoretical and from experimen-
tal point of view is important. If there exists a ’cortical principle’ of parallel computation,
of at least a few relatively simple ones, as we have argued in section 7.4.3, this could
well lead to an understanding of how to implement ’cortical principles’ in hardware, and
thus offer a realistic estimate as to what cortical function can be succesfully emulated into
which type of hardware.
• Thecreationofvisualizationtoolswhichallowanoverviewoftheproject, ateverypossible
level.
7.7 Discussion
In the ﬁrst steps of the project, that we propose in the section above, there are many activities
which are now done by various grous around the world. We hope, that by creating a single project
which can serve as a framework for these activities, and also by creating a central hardware
platform, a ’condensation point’ for these activities will emerge. This will provide a strong
incentive for various groups to work together in a natural way.
It is interesting to look at other sciences which have established multi-disciplinary collaborations,
such as bioinformatics. It is clear that the Humane Genome Project has provided an enormous
drive for the coordination of many activities in this ﬁeld. Another ﬁeld which is centered around
large projects is high energy physics. The existence of only a few large accelerators in the
world has also created natural ’condensation points’ for this branch of science. In high energy
physics knowledge of electronics, heavy engineering (accelerators and detectors are huge), de-
tector physics and the underlying theoretical concepts of particle physics come together. High
energy physics has created WWW, and has developped software suites for detector simulation, data
analysis and visualisation, which are used by virtually every high energy physics laborotory in
the world. Moreover, its database techniques and projects for distributed computing (the GRID
project) draw much attention from other branches of science. This impressive computing infras-
tructure of high energy physics was developed by many people, from various disciplines, who
were working together to bring a highly ambitious single project to a good end.62 CHAPTER 7. THE ’CONSTRUCTED’ BRAINChapter 8
The Brainprobe project-Tools for
Neuroscience
8.1 Introduction
Why do we need neuroscience?
Never has information technology realized so acutely that it’s traditional ways of tackling prob-
lems fall short and has the quest for using smarter, more cognitive artifacts been more pressing.
Computer vision is going cognitive at every occasion, IST has launched a call for cognitive sys-
tems, robotics dreams of cognitive robots, objective of the ’Beyond robotics’ FET call, in this
roadmap we are proposing self-aware complex systems etc. Thus at the technical side there is
a tremendous need for facts and even more so for principles about brain functioning. This need
does not only follows from the fact that we want smarter, more reliable, more ﬂexible systems.
The need equally proceeds from the observation that artifacts of whatever nature, in most cases
have to interact with humans and have to be accepted by them and thus must somehow be tuned
to the human mind. On the other hand neuroscience, and in particular the systems neuroscience
which is the component most relevant to information technology, is making giant leaps forward
due the introduction of functional imaging techniques of the brain. This has cumulated recently
in the introduction of functional imaging in primates, which establishes the bridge between the
human work and the knowledge from invasive techniques, accumulated the last forty years. That
this last development has occurred in two European labs opens an extraordinary opportunity
for the EU to lead the world in linking neuroscience and information technology, in particular,
computer science and robotics.
Despite the difﬁculties it is facing, European neuroscience, or at least its most performing lab-
oratories, has been very responsive, not just because FET has provided them with much needed
support. There are two extremely compelling arguments for neuroscientists to collaborate with
engineers. First, trying to build real world systems provides a much clearer picture of the prob-
lems an artiﬁcial system, thus also the brain, has to solve. The classical example in vision is
segmentation. Neurophysiologists became aware of this problem only after engineers had made
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them realize that the single stimulus introduced by psychology hundred ﬁfty years ago was a
laboratory abstraction: what is present on the retina is a spatio-temporal distribution of light, not
the image of an object. The second reason is that the brain is so complex that even models are
insufﬁcient to understand this complex reality and that it is even more difﬁcult testing that the
model captures all the facts. By building a real system according to the model and verifying that
indeed this system solves the problem, provides evidence in favor of the model. Given the need
for an increased cooperation between neuroscience and information technology, it makes sense
to increase the potential of European neuroscience, so as to enhance the dialogue. It is indeed the
case that to list the problems is easier than to solve them, and that the more efﬁcient neuroscience
gets, the more information technology will beneﬁt from the dialogue. In order to know how to
strengthen neuroscience, it is crucial to understand the complexity of the brain, an organ different
from any other in the biosphere.
What makes the brain so special?
The brain differs from most other organs of the body because of the connections between neu-
rons: each of the 10 billion or so neurons in the human brain is connected to 1000 or more other
neurons. The cerebral function is heavily dependent on these connections: in fact knowing all
the detail of the cellular equipment of neurons is insufﬁcient to understand brain function. Brain
function arises from the concerted action of anatomically organized groups of neurons.
These anatomical connections determine the supra-neuronal levels of integration typical to the
brain: the local network level (e.g. cortical columns), the functional map level (e.g. primary
visual cortex) and the system level (e.g. the visual system). In addition, there are the neuronal
and subneuronal levels, these latter including the subcellular-part level (e.g. the synapse) and the
molecular level. Although these latter levels are also found in other cell types, some of them,
e.g. the synapse or certain molecules producing transmitters, are typical for the brain.
To understand the brain we need to be able to address these different levels, and integrate infor-
mation across levels e.g. by modeling (see chapter constructed brain). While we have powerful
techniques to address the neuronal level (single cell recording in awake animals), the whole
brain level (psychology and cognitive sciences), and of course the subcellular (patch clamp etc),
molecular and genetic levels, techniques to address the supraneuronal levels have only begin to
develop recently. These supraneuronal levels are extremely critical for understanding brain func-
tion and are most relevant to neuro-IT, because they embody the computational principles we
want to endow artifacts with. We propose that the combination of dense multiple recording with
functional imaging can address these intermediate levels of integration and provide the data re-
quired for relating all integration levels from the single cell to the whole brain level. If Neuro-IT
is to ﬂourish these techniques have to be developed further at maximum strength. Only then will
neuroscience be able to produce the data required by the modeling and computational studies,
which are at the heart of neuro-IT. The different levels of possible interactions between systems
neuroscience and robotics are indicated in ﬁgure 8.1
Although this roadmap is intended for Neuro-IT it is worth mentioning that most of the rec-
ommendations made here, hold for other programs such as Quality of Life. In fact the only
justiﬁcation for the experimental strategies recommended in this document, however useful for
FET and IST, resides in the medical domain. These recommendations may be the more useful8.2. OBJECTIVES 65
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Figure 8.1: The different levels of possible interactions between neuroscience and robotics.
that it has recently become clear (EU conference on structuring the European brain research,
18/9/03) that the crucial intermediate levels of brain organization have been largely neglected in
the ﬁrst calls of Quality of Life under the sixth framework. This was the unfortunate consequence
of treating the brain as any other organ of the human body.
8.2 Objectives
1. Strengthen the knowledge base of European neuroscience, to enhance the cooperation be-
tween information technology and the neuroscience
2. To be able to record simultaneously and chronically from 1000 neurons in 5 or more brain
structures and to able to relate these measurements to the different non-invasive, high res-
olution brain imaging modalities: fMRI, EEG, MEG, PET.
3. To be able to use these measurements to understand the operations performed by the differ-
ent brain structures, not just simple input-output relationships but representations emerging
in complex networks.
4. To obtain these measurements under a wide range of conditions including in realistic
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5. , To combine these measurements with physical (electric stimulation, cooling) or chemical
(pharmacological local injection) manipulation of neural activity or transmitter systems
8.3 Examples of realizations
• Understand how primates and humans head through the environment, grasp, catch or ma-
nipulate objects.
• Understand how primates and humans classify objects and actions in a scene and perform
other cognitive tasks.
• Understand how learning and training change the representations in the brain and enhance
performance.
• Provide the underpinning of systematic use of brain imaging for clinical and pharmaceuti-
cal investigations.
• Decrease the need for invasive experiments
8.4 Current state of technology
8.4.1 Brain imaging technologies
Positron emission tomography
Positron emission tomography (PET) uses radioactive tracers to visualize brain function. With
modern scanners the amount of tracer to be injected is minimal and studies are ethically readily
justiﬁed, but as a rule subjects can only participate in a single session per year.
Depending on the tracer used the PET scanning will measure either regional cerebral blood ﬂow
(using radioactive water) or label receptors or other molecules related to synaptic transmission
or cell to cell communication. In studies of regional cerebral blood ﬂow one compares levels
of activation in different conditions, since regional blood ﬂow correlates with neuronal activity.
During the 1985-1995 period this was the main avenue for functional study of the human brain
(Fox et al., 1986; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988; Dupont et al., 1993; Dupont,
Orban, De Bruyn, Verbruggen, & Mortelmans, 1994; Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1993). Spa-
tial resolution of PET activation studies was limited by the need to average across subjects and
also by the physical process of positron emission, typical values were full width at half height
(FWHH) of 16 mm. While this resolution was plenty to discern coarse localization in the brain,
it was inadequate to study neighboring functional maps, some of which may only be 10 or 15
mm in size. Therefore activation studies have been taken over by functional Magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) which has better spatial resolution: FWHH of 7-10 mm for group studies and
2-4 mm for single subject studies. FMRI allows repeated testing of the same subject and com-
parison between different activation regions in a single subject. FMRI is subject to susceptibility
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language where these regions are crucial, PET activation studies remain an option, as they are
also in Fluoro-deoxyglucose (FDG) PET correlation studies with behavioral deﬁcits in patients.
PET remains unsurpassed for its other main application: studies of neuronal transmission. In
fact, with the advent of new more powerful and higher resolution cameras (micro-PET), claimed
to reach mm resolution, this is presently the main avenue for so-called metabolic imaging, which
is outside the scope of the this review. This will be of interest for animal experiments where the
system has to be manipulated by local pharmacological injection. These experiments will also
be important complements for fMRI studies with pharmacological (systemic) challenges. A
ﬁnal remark about metabolic PET: this technique depends heavily on the development of tracers
and on radioactive chemistry laboratories (and cyclotron) to produce these tracers locally.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
fMRI is based on the BOLD (brain oxygen level dependent) effect reﬂecting the different param-
agnetic properties of oxy- and deoxy-hemoglobine (Belliveau et al., 1991; Kwong et al., 1992).
In fact the BOLD effect is dependent on three hemodynamic variables: blood ﬂow, blood volume
and oxygen extraction. This effect increases with diameter of the vessel explaining why BOLD
imaging necessarily suffers from a draining vein problem (Mandeville & Marota, 1999). Many
of the new sequences and one of the reasons to move to higher ﬁeld strength is to minimize this
localization artifact. The other reason for higher ﬁeld strength is a better signal to noise ratio,
which can then be traded for resolution. The typical voxel size in 1.5T magnets is 3x3x4.5 mm,
which is gradually replaced by 2x2x2.mm in 3T magnets, which are becoming the new standard.
Just as PET activation studies, fMRI measures neuronal activity indirectly and needs to compare
MR signals in different conditions. In the simplest design, two conditions are presented in alter-
native epochs and mean MR activity in the two epochs is compared, either using General linear
theory, as in Statistical parametric mapping (SPM), or by correlating the time course of stimulus
alternation with that of the MR activity, as e.g. in AFNI. To enhance the interpretability of the
ﬁndings it is very useful to add a third low level control condition (e.g. simple ﬁxation in visual
studies) to the two other conditions which are matched as closely as possible to extract the effect
of single factor. By adding a low-level control we can disentangle small differences in activation
of in deactivation (relative to baseline) between the main conditions.
This subtraction design has been criticized in the sense that it is difﬁcult to isolate a single
cognitive factor, since the factor interacts with other cognitive factors, already present in the
lower level condition. This is far less a problem in simpler sensory experiments in which the
subtraction design has proved very useful. To isolate the effect of cognitive factors in more
complex experiments, other designs such as factorial and parametric designs have been used
(Friston, 1997). Factorial designs have the additional advantage that interactions between factors
can be studied. While it may be difﬁcult to isolate a cognitive factor in a single subtraction this
might be obtained by taking the conjunction of different subtractions (Price & Friston, 1997).
Therequirementsarethateachofthesubtractionisolatesthefactorinquestionevenifmixedwith
other irrelevant factors, and that these other factors differ between the subtractions. Conjunctions
are also useful to make sure that higher order effects such as interactions are studied in relevant
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Although fMRI provides signal strong enough to study single subjects, one needs to record from
several subjects to ensure the generality of the ﬁnding. On one extreme, are group studies in
which all subjects are averaged together which will ensure that a ﬁnding is representative. Simple
ﬁxed effect models allow one to derive conclusions only about the population scanned. To ensure
general conclusions, one needs to use the random effect model in which both within and between
subject variability are modeled. The prize to pay for this generality are very high thresholds if
one corrects fully for multiple corrections. Classically, one accepts as signiﬁcant voxels reaching
p < 0:05 corrected for multiple corrections, unless a priori information is available, in which
case p < 0:001 uncorrected is acceptable for signiﬁcance. The risk of false negatives in random
effects can be alleviated by restricting the analysis either spatially (e.g. to the posterior part of
the brain) or functionally by a low level subtraction (e.g. only visually responsive voxels) or by
lowering the threshold, e.g. to p < 0:0001 uncorrected, taking into account the number of false
positives. On the other hand, are studies in which only single subject analyses are performed.
This is especially attractive when different functional activation patterns have to be compared
spatially, i.e. when overlap or juxtaposition between the activated regions has to be established.
In between we ﬁnd the ROI analysis in which the ROI can be deﬁned anatomically but more
generally functionally by a so-called localizer scan. Much of the results of these studies depend
on the deﬁnition of the ROI. The better established the identity of the ROI, the more the localizer
paradigm is standardized, the more reliable the localization of the ROI in a given subject will
be. Examples of well-deﬁned ROIs are the topographically - deﬁned regions in sensory cortex
(e.g. retinotopic regions in the visual cortex). Their identity is well established, at least the early
ones, the paradigm to deﬁne them is well established (Shipp, Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1995;
Sereno et al., 1995) and a good experimenter will be careful to sample enough images so that the
area or subarea (Heeger, Boynton, Demb, Seidemann, & Newsome, 1999) is unequivocally de-
ﬁned. The differences between magnitudes of the MR activity averaged over the ROI in different
conditions can then be tested statistically (e.g. with ANOVA) across a number of subjects.
The time course of the BOLD effect is slow, yet fast enough to be convolved with brief trials or
with different subperiods of long trials, in what is referred to as event-related fMRI. In the brief
trial version, activity is measured only when the subject is engaged in the trial rather than over
a whole block of trials including the intertrial intervals as done in block designs. In addition,
this technique allows the comparison between different types of trials, e.g. correct and incorrect
trials, trials with targets and without distracters, trials with stimuli in different parts of the visual
ﬁeld etc. The cost of these more speciﬁc activation patterns is the loss of statistical power: event
related activation levels are weaker than block design activation levels. This lack of power can
be offset by increasing the number of subjects. 47 subjects participated in a recent event related
fMRI study of remembering (Wheeler & Buckner, 2003). An increasingly used application of
event-related fMRI is the repetition paradigm. In this paradigm, trails with two identical or dif-
ferent stimuli are compared with trials in which two stimuli are presented of which it is unknown
whether or not the brain treats them as different. The MR activity will be lower for identical stim-
uli than different ones. Depending on whether the MR activity is low or high in the trials with
unknown stimuli, one concludes that a brain region treats them either as identical or as different.
The time-related fMRI with long trials allows the experimenter to separate processes that operate
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working memory trials (D’Esposito et al., 1995; Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, & Haxby,
1998; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). Of course this is natural in tasks
such as working memory tasks where the delay has to be long, but may be more difﬁcult to apply
to other tasks such as performing mathematical operations. Indeed, it requires introduction of
long delays which may be unnatural for this type of tasks.
fMRI only indicates that signals related to average neural activity differ between conditions. It
is badly in need of validation and even more so the adaptation paradigm. In humans fMRI can
be compared to neuropsychological data: if a region, active in a task is critical, its’ destruction
should impair the task. In practice this rationale is difﬁcult to apply since lesions generally are
vascular in origin and affect large, stereotyped regions of cortex, e.g. the territory of the middle
cerebral artery. Therefore fMRI has relied very heavily on comparison with single cell data
obtained in the awake monkey. The monkey is indeed the only adequate animal model for higher
order brain functions. It poses however a severe problem (Orban, 2002) since the comparison
entails both a change in species and a change in technique and one needs to understand the effect
of both factors. This cannot be solved easily unless one resorts to a new technique, fMRI in
the awake monkey (Vanduffel et al., 2001; Nakahara, Hayashi, Konishi, & Miyashita, 2002;
Vanduffel et al., 2002). With fMRI in the awake monkey these questions can be uncoupled. On
one hand, one compares within the same species single cell recordings, and other local electrical
changes, with MR signals (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001). On the
other hand, one compares with the same technique human and monkey brains, and addresses the
homology problem between these two primate brains (Nakahara et al., 2002; Vanduffel et al.,
2002).
In monkey the functional MR signals are smaller than in humans and the initial measurements
withsimpleBOLDwereheavilycontaminatedbyartifacts(L.etal., 1998; Dubowitzetal., 1998).
This can be solved either by resorting to high ﬁelds (Logothetis, Guggenberger, Peled, & Pauls,
1999) or by using a contrast agent (Vanduffel et al., 2001). In this latter study monocristalline
iron oxyde nanoparticle (MION), developed by Weissleder at MGH, was used as contrast agent.
This agent not only produces a 5 fold increase in the contrast to noise ratio but also provides MR
signal arising from the capillaries located in the gray matter rather than from small veins above
the cortex as BOLD does. Given the lack of problems resulting from long lasting chronic use of
this contrast agent there is hope that it might be approved for use in humans, if not for routine use
in normal subjects, at least in patients. A gain in signal would be welcome in clinical fMRI, e.g.
in pre-operative assessment. It is worth pointing out that Europe has a leading position in this
new technique, monkey fMRI, which has not at all been exploited at the European Community
level.
Functional connectivity
Activation studies as performed with fMRI only provide a static description of a set of cerebral
regions active (or more active) in given experimental conditions. What is really needed is a
functional description of the cerebral network active in a task, i.e. not just a description of the
nodes but also of the links between them. Functional connectivity is distinct from the anatomi-
cal connections, which are ﬁxed (although modiﬁable by plasticity). Depending on the task the
anatomical connections will be used differently and functional connectivity refers to these ad-
justable strengths of existing connections. It differs from effective connectivity, which simply70 CHAPTER 8. THE BRAINPROBE PROJECT
refers to the positive or negative correlation of activities in two regions.
In order to investigate the functional connectivity between active brain regions, structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM) technique is commonly considered for computing the connection weights
in a predeﬁned network, both in PET (McIntosh et al., 1994) and fMRI (B¨ uchel & Friston, 1997).
Task-related changes in connectivity have also been considered with this technique (B¨ uchel &
Friston, 1997). Alternatives to SEM, but that allow for non-linear and/or time-variant connec-
tion weights, have also been introduced, e.g. based on Kalman ﬁltering (B¨ uchel & Friston,
1998) and Volterra kernels (Friston & B¨ uchel, 1998). Bullmore and co-workers (Bullmore et al.,
2000) tested whether or not the suggested network could have been drawn from a distribution
of ”optimal” models generated by a heuristic search algorithm. More recently, Dynamic Causal
Modelling (DCM) ((Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003); see also SPM2 beta release) has been
introduced to determine the connection weights in a predeﬁned network. Generally, this prede-
ﬁned network is unknown in humans.
Tracing anatomical connections with MRI
In vivo tract tracing refers to local injections in to a brain region of a tracer that can be visualized
in the MR. So far only one study has been performed in the monkey (Saleem et al., 2002) using
Magnesium and investigating connections of basal ganglia. The interpretation of such studies is
compounded by the inﬂuence of magnesium on the neuronal function.
An alternative for in vivo tract tracing that can be used in humans as well as animal models,
is Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI). DTI exploits the asymmetry of motion of water molecules
in nerve axons, but is in its infancy. Major problems are absence of signals within the cortex
and disentangling the multiple crossing axons. When further developed this technique will need
veriﬁcationinanimalmodels, inwhichanatomicalconnectionsareknown, asopposedtoinferred
in humans.
Increasing the temporal resolution: EEG and MEG
The main shortcoming of fMRI is its relatively low temporal resolution, even in event related
mode, especially in comparison with the time course of single cell activity. Since a few years it
has been repeatedly suggested that this can be remedied by integrating fMRI with EEG or MEG,
which suffer from the opposite limitation. Although several attempts have been made (e.g. Dale
et al., 2000) this problem is not completely solved in humans. It is worth noting that EEG and
fMRI signals can in principle be acquired simultaneously, MEG and fMRI cannot. One should
also note that MEG reﬂects in principle activity mainly of pyramidal cells in banks of sulci, while
the EEG reﬂects more the pyramidal cells on the gyri.
In that sense EEG and MEG are complementary. So far these fusion of imaging techniques has
not been attempted in animal models, although again this is the only way to validate them.
Other imaging technologies with limited use
Optical recording (Grinvald, Lieke, Frostig, & Hildesheim, 1994) has a good spatio-temporal
resolution but its applicability to old world monkeys is restricted because it requires ﬂat pieces
of cortex that are accessible. For example in the visual system only V1, a 2 mm wide strip of V2
and V4 can be studied. Similarly 2-deoxyglucose technique, which has an excellent sensitivity
and spatial resolution (Tootell, Hamilton, Silverman, & Switkes, 1988; Vanduffel, Tootell, &
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label and double label 2DG). Also this technique is very invasive and critically depends on the
availability of speciﬁc ﬁlms (at least the double label version). For the sake of completeness we
mention 2- photon and intracellular synaptic imaging.
8.4.2 Multiple single cell recordings
Obviously more information can be obtained from recording multiple single neurons rather than
a single neuron. Equally obvious, one should not confuse multiple single cell recording with
multi-unit recordings which can be more or less noisy. The noisier the recording, the less clear
it is that one records from local neurons as opposed to ﬁbers of unknown origin. The initial
techniques (e.g. tetrodes, Thomas recording electrodes) allowed recording of small number of
neurons, typically 2-5. The aim was to study synaptic connectivity or to increase the number of
neurons tested. More recently attempts have been made to record from large numbers of neurons,
as initially done in the rat by Nicolelis. The transfer of this type of experiments to the monkey
has been difﬁcult but has now been achieved. Arrays of 100 electrodes have been used even in
different parts of cortex (Hoffman & McNaughton, 2002; Donoghue, 2002). One drawback of
multiple recordings is that all neurons are tested with a uniform set of stimuli or conditions and
stimuli cannot be tailored to the requirements of each neuron. The technique, however, opens
much wider perspectives as many problems can be addressed, e.g. functional architecture see
Diogo, Soares, Koulakov, Albright, and Gattass (2003), in addition to synchronization of signals
between areas (Hoffman & McNaughton, 2002). One of the other motivations behind these mul-
tiple recordings is to control a robot arm or other artifacts by the brain signals obtained. For this
purpose the recording of single neurons on each electrode may not be required, local ﬁeld po-
tentials may sufﬁce (B., Pezaris, Sahani, Mitra, & Andersen, 2002). Potentially these recording
could be chronic, allowing to address important questions such as changes in neural activity with
learning or prolonged testing of the same set of neurons under widely varying conditions, which
may be required to crack problems such as the code of shape representation in IT. The critical
point here is not so much to obtain long-term recording but to prove that one is recording from
the same neuron over long periods of time.
Links of fMRI with neuronal activity
In a seminal study Logothetis et al. (2001) compared fMRI signal to electrical neural recorded
simultaneously with an electrode from the cortex imaged. This revealed that fMRI signals corre-
late with local ﬁeld potentials more than with spike activity. It seems thus likely that MR signals
reﬂect more the afferent input and even more local processing in an area than the output of that
regions to other brain regions. A far more complex problem is the relationship between selectiv-
ity or tuning observed in single cell recordings with average activity of large groups of neurons
underlying the vascular response measured with fMRI. Adaptation experiments are touted here
as the solution for fMRI but this has not been proven. Indeed the only attempt of validation so
far has reached paradoxical results (Tolias, Smirnakis, Augath, Trinath, & Logothetis, 2001).
8.4.3 Manipulation of brain structures
Lesion studies in which part of the brain is permanently damaged, either by surgical excision
or by local injection of neurotoxic substances, such as ibotenic acid, are usually combined with72 CHAPTER 8. THE BRAINPROBE PROJECT
behavioral testing (e.g. Orban, Saunders, & Vandenbussche, 1995). Note that the ibotenic acid
lesions are more speciﬁc than surgical excision, as ﬁbers of passage are spared. This was an
important step forward to disentangle the role of hippocampus and overlying perirhinal cortex
in delayed match to sample tasks (Squire, 1986). Electrical stimulation is generally used for
manipulations in the opposite sense, i.e. driving a brain area. There is long tradition to use elec-
trical stimulation in motor studies. It’s application in sensory regions is more recent (Salzman,
Murasugi, Britten, & Newsome, 1992) and seems to depend on some uniformity in the neuronal
properties at the stimulation site. This was the case in the Salzman et al. (1992) study in which
all the cells in a direction column of MT/V5 share the same preferred direction.
Pharmacological agents can also be injected locally to manipulate the local neuronal activity.
So-called inactivation studies rely on transitory silencing of neurons in a given region, typically
with drug injections such as lidocaine (local anaesthetic) or muscimol (Gaba agonist). This
has been combined with behavioral measures or single cell recordings in an effort to identify
afferent systems (Ferrera, Nealey, & Maunsell, 1994) The problem here is to inactivate large
enough regions to obtain reliable effects especially in behavioral studies. An alternative is local
cooling, which generally can affect large enough regions and can be more rapidly reversed, but
which is difﬁcult to restrict to a given anatomical region (Girard, Lomber, & Bullier, 2002).
Pharmacologically it has recently (Jones and Sillito, unpublished) become possible to locally
increase neuronal activity, even only stimulus driven activity (and not spontaneous activity).
Finally it is worth mentioning that in humans systemic injection of pharmacological agents is
used in pharmacological challenge studies (Rosier et al., 1997) in which task/stimulus and drug
interactions are imaged. Extension of these studies to animal models should enhance consider-
ably their use for the clinical and pharmacological purposes.
8.4.4 Visual and sensory systems
Monkey visual system
It is now more than ten years since Felleman and Van Essen (1991) Felleman and Van Essen
(1991) compiled the visual cortical areas in the monkey. Beyond primary visual cortex, the mon-
key cortex contains about 30 different extrastriate visual cortical areas. Each of these areas is on
average connected to 10 other afferent and efferent regions. Thus the primate visual system is an
extremely complex system that adapts its conﬁguration to the visual task at hand. In comparison
rodents have only a few extrastriate areas. Thus except for matching with molecular studies, the
physiological exploration of the rat visual system has no interest for understanding the human
visual system.
The nice maps of monkey extrastriate cortex should not hide the fact that our knowledge of the
best known sensory system is still very fragmentary. In a number of instances the boundaries
of a number of areas are not ﬁrmly established. Cortical areas are identiﬁed by the four cri-
teria: connection pattern, cyto-and myelo-architecture, topographic organization and functional
properties. The evidence is lacking in case of division of the infero-temporal cortex or that of
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and superior temporal sulcus (STS). Even those regions for which
the boundaries are established have not all been explored in detail: only one study has been de-
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as area MT/V5, are not well understood: their role in visual perception is far from clear. Ini-
tially, MT/V5 was a motion area but it is becoming increasingly an area involved in 3D analysis
(Bradley, Chang, & Andersen, 1998; Xiao, Marcar, Rraiguel, & Orban, 1997; Orban, Sunaert,
Todd, Van Hecke, & Marchal, 1999). The overall impression of systems or integrative Neuro-
science is that of a very conservative ﬁeld. This is largely due to the labor-intensive character of
the single cell studies: it takes one man year to perform a study exploring the response of neurons
in a given area to a new set of stimuli. Often these studies are performed by young PhD students
and the supervisor will choose a well-known area in which the stimuli will work. Hence, most of
the progress is achieved by young independent researchers, such as assistant professors, who can
afford to take risks because they have proven themselves as PhD and post doc. One should note
that in Europe the ultra-conservative policy for academic recruitments, related to job security,
hampers the recruitment of exactly this sort of innovative researchers.
Many of the main functions of the primate visual system, the knowledge of which is needed by
those building artiﬁcial systems, are still little explored. Segmentation, extraction of 3D shape
from different cues, building representations of objects and actions are not well understood. The
task dependency of the visual system (Dupont et al., 1993; Fias, Dupont, Reynvoet, & Orban,
2002) has been explored to some extent in human imaging, but has hardly been addressed in sin-
gle cell studies. The role of feedback which is anatomically well documented, has hardly been
explored physiologically (Hupi et al., 1998).
Human visual system
Functional imaging has shown that in general terms to visual system of all primates are similar.
The early retinotopic regions (V1,V2, V3) are similar in lay-out in humans and monkeys(Sereno
et al., 1995; Fize et al., 2003). In the same vein the visual system in both species is divided
in dorsal and ventral stream related to where and what processing respectively. These stream
process to some degree different attributes (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Haxby et al., 1994),
for different behavioral purposes (Goodale & Milner, 1992), using different cognitive operations
(Fias et al., 2002). As imaging in both species progresses differences start to appear. V3A has
similar retinotopic organization in both species, yet is both stereo and motion sensitive in humans
but only stereo sensitive in monkeys (Tootell et al., 1997; Vanduffel et al., 2001; Tsao, Conway,
& Livingstone, 2003). The IPS of humans processes motion information, and in particular ex-
tracts 3D from motion, much more than its monkey counterpart (Vanduffel et al., 2002; Orban
et al., 2003). For years there have been heated discussions about homologies, e.g. the debate
between Tootell and Zeki (Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale, Cavanagh, & Tootell, 1998; Bartels & Zeki,
2000) related to the color-processing region. This was largely based on an absence of relevant
data. Now that both brains can be imaged exactly in parallel, these problems can be rigorously
addressed. We have no idea of how many cortical areas the human visual system contains, cer-
tainly more than. One should remember that some 80the parts underlying higher functions, is
still unknown.
Other sensory systems.
There is a general lack, also in Europe, of primates studies on other senses. This is particularly
true for the tactile sense. Here also a number of cortical areas have been mapped and it has been
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cortex and the insula respectively. Even more so we have little clues about the role of these
different regions.
8.4.5 Motor systems
The frontal lobe of primates is formed by two main sectors: a rostral one (prefrontal cortex) that
has essentially cognitive functions and a caudal one that is related to the control of movements.
Histologically, the caudal sector is characterized by its almost complete lacks of granular cells
(agranular frontal cortex).
The agranular frontal cortex (henceforth referred to as motor cortex) is cytoarchitectonically
not homogeneous, but constituted of several distinct motor name areas named according to a
terminology derived from Von Economo F1- F7 (see (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998)).
Five areas lie on the lateral cortical surface, two on its mesial surface. Comparing this motor
cortex subdivision with the classical map of Brodmann, F1 corresponds to Brodmann area 4
(primary motor cortex) while the other motor areas (F2-F7) lie inside Brodmann area 6. The
subdivision of the motor cortex into 7 areas was originally described in monkeys. A similar
subdivision starts to become clear also in humans although some aspects of it as not yet clear
such as the border between the dorsal (F2 and F7) and ventral motor areas (F4 and F5) and within
the ventral premotor cortex.
Why there are so many motor areas? Such a multiplicity is surprising, especially if one accepts
the classical view that motor areas had as their only functional role the control of body part
movements. Indeed the primary motor cortex is involved in the execution of movements and the
school of Georgopoulos has shown that the parameters direction and distance of movement to a
target are encoded independently in M1 and premotor neurons. Recent neurophysiological data
showed, however, that motor areas play a broader role in behavior and are involved in functions
traditionally considered proper of higher order associative cortical areas.
First of all, motor areas are involved in a series of sensory-motor transformations. Among them,
particularly complex are those that transform visual information on objects and object location
into the appropriate goal-directed actions. Second, motor areas are endowed with a mechanism
that matches observed actions on the internal motor representations of those actions (mirror
mechanism). This mechanism may contribute not only to action recognition and preparation but
also to learning of actions. Third, motor areas are involved in decisional processes that lead to
actioninitiation. Finally, somepremotorareas(SMAandpre-SMA)areinvolvedinthecontrolof
sequences of movements (Tanji et al., 1996). Recent studies of the connections of the motor areas
with cortical areas outside the agranular frontal cortex (”extrinsic connections”) showed that
there is a marked difference in connection organization between the posterior motor areas - areas
F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 - and the anterior motor areas - areas F6 and F7 - (Luppino & Rizzolatti,
2000)(Luppino and Rizzolatti, 2000). The posterior motor areas receive their main cortical input
form the parietal lobe (”parieto-dependent” motor areas). In contrast, the anterior motor areas
receive their main cortical connections from the prefrontal cortex (”prefronto-dependent” motor
areas).
This subdivision of motor areas is in accord with their connections with other motor areas (”in-
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area), but have diffuse connections with the other motor areas. In contrast, the parieto-dependent
areas are connected with F1 and are linked among them in a precise somatotopic manner (Mat-
sumura & Kubota, 1979; Muakkassa & Strick, 1979; Matelli, Camarda, Glickstein, & Rizzolatti,
1986; Luppino, Matelli, Camarda, & Rizzolatti, 1993).
Another anatomical ﬁnding that strongly supports the validity of this subdivision is the organi-
zation of cortico-spinal projections. The parieto-dependent motor areas send direct projections
to the spinal cord, while the prefronto-dependent do not (Keizer & Kuypers, 1989; He, Dum,
& Strick, 1993; Galea & Darian-Smith, 1994; He, Dum, & Strick, 1995). Speciﬁcally, F1, F2,
F3, part of F4, and that part of F5 that is buried in the inferior arcuate sulcus (F5 of the arcuate
bank or F5ab) give origin to the cortico-spinal tract, while F6 (pre-SMA) and F7 project to the
brainstem.
From these anatomical data, it appears inescapable to conclude that the two sets of areas play
different roles in motor control. Parieto-dependent areas receive rich sensory information orig-
inating from the parietal lobe and use it for action. This process occurs in parallel in several
circuits, each of which is involved in speciﬁc sensory-motor transformations, e.g. for reaching
or grasping. F1, F3 and that part of F2 that is located around the superior precentral dimple
(dimple sector) use, for this process, somatosensory information, while F4, F5 and the rostro-
ventral part of F2 use also visual information. The scanty sensory information that reaches the
prefronto-dependent motor areas renders very unlikely that they also play a role in sensory-motor
transformations. The prefronto-dependent motor areas receive higher order cognitive informa-
tion, related to long-term motor plans and motivation. On this basis, it appears logical to posit
that these areas have a control function. Most likely they determine when and in which circum-
stances the activity generated in the parieto-dependent areas -potential motor actions- becomes
an actual motor action.
8.4.6 Cognitive systems
It is well established (Fuster & Alexander, 1971) that prefrontal neurons display delay activity
in the interval between two stimuli or between a stimulus and a response in delayed match to
sample or response tasks. Neurons in higher order cortices such as parietal or infero-temporal
cortex share this property. Typical for prefrontal neurons is that the delay activity represents the
sample whereas delay activity of infero-temporal cortex only represents the last stimulus (Miller,
Erickson, & Desimone, 1996). Although initially (Wilson, O’Scalaidhe, & Goldman-Rakic,
1993) it was claimed that delay activity in dorsal and ventral parts of prefrontal cortex, linked
with dorsal and ventral visual pathways respectively, were specialized for spatial and ﬁgural
informationrespectively, recentstudiesmainlyfromMiller’sgroup(Rao, Rainer, &Miller, 1997)
suggestthisisnotthecase. Alsoinhumanimagingithasbeendifﬁcult(Smith&Jonides, 1999)to
show a segregation in prefrontal cortex between object and spatial working memory. Alternative
schemes proposed segregation within prefrontal cortex of maintenance and executive functions
in working memory.
In addition to delay activity, the task dependency of prefrontal activity has been recently docu-
mented physiologically (Rainer, Rao, & Miller, 1999; Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 2000), as well76 CHAPTER 8. THE BRAINPROBE PROJECT
as its role in categorization (Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002). While the lateral aspect of pre-
frontal cortex is heavily engaged in cognitive processing, the medial and basal prefrontal cortex
is engaged in motivational and reward processing. Selectivity of medial prefrontal neurons for
type or value of reward has been demonstrated (Tremblay, Hollerman, & Schulz, 1998). These
responses are probably reﬂecting input from the basal ganglia and the substantia nigra (reﬂecting
reward incongruence). In addition to prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex has been shown to con-
tribute to cognitive functions. According to Goldberg and coworkers, a saliency map resides in
area LIP (Gottlieb, Kusunoki, & Goldberg, 1998). This saliency is dependent both on physical
factors (pop-out in the stimulus) and on behavioral factors (aspects in the image that are rele-
vant for the present behavior). LIP works in tandem with prefrontal cortex, in particular with
the Frontal eye ﬁeld (FEF) for controlling explicit and implicit shifts in attention (Schall, 1995;
Schall, Morel, King, & Bullier, 1995; Corbetta et al., 1998).
8.5 Problem areas
8.5.1 Long-term recordings with multiple electrodes
The two main problems are the damage to the cortex and the recording of the same neurons
over long time. It has become amply clear that the monkey (and perhaps human) cortex is
much more vulnerable than say rodent cerebral cortex. Thus methods to evaluate damage and
to restrict damage are urgently needed. The scaling of these problems with size of the electrode
array should also be addressed. The stability of the recordings is the other problem. It is one
thing to have single cell quality recording for months or years, which some groups claim to have
achieved, it is another thing to be conﬁdent that each day on a given electrode you record from
the same neuron. This is probably the most important problem, since it would extend the use of
the technique tremendously, e.g. many training experiments would become possible.
8.5.2 Scanning moving subjects
The present day scanning situation is dramatically restricted. The head of the subject has to be
precisely ﬁxed, the subjects lie in a conﬁned space. Auditory stimulation is difﬁcult because
of noise of the scanner, access to the body is restricted for somato-sensory stimulation, visual
stimulation is generally restricted to a part of the visual ﬁeld.
The present day trend is to go for higher ﬁelds to increase the ﬁeld strength to increase S/N ratio
and resolution. Perhaps we should envision the opposite possibility: lower ﬁeld strength in which
wide bore magnets can be used and in which some subject movement is tolerable. The use of a
contrast agent such as MION would still provide a reasonable S/N ratio and resolution (in fact
the effect of MION compared to Bold increases with lower ﬁeld strength).
The development of new sequences providing new type of information about brain function
remains important, as is the development of new coils.8.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 77
8.5.3 MEG for monkeys
Allbrainimagingmodalitiessufferfromthesamelimitation: lackofvalidationinanimalmodels.
Do they really measure what they are claimed to measure? This can only be tested if other
sources of information (a ground truth) is available, as it is the case for monkeys in which many
invasive experiments have been performed. Thus the new brain imaging techniques and their
fusion should be tested in monkeys. EEG and now fMRI are readily performed in the monkey,
but MEG would require adaptation of the present equipment, perhaps that for children could be
used.
8.5.4 Few mathematical tools
Just like mathematics were developed for physics then for economics, we need mathematics for
biology and in particular for neuroscience. Of course statistics is used, as in many sciences, im-
age processing etc. What we need are new mathematical tools to deal with the multiple electrode
signals and/or the MRI signals. Mathematics for complex dynamic systems might prove useful.
One should keep in mind that in many cases the data are sparse and non-stationary.
8.5.5 Education of the public
In its majority the public is supportive of medical research even that involving animals, the more
so that it has clinical applications. We need to educate the public about the distance between
basic and clinical science: that a clinical success builds on years of basic research. This is even
more true for neuroscience, because of the complexity of brain function. To quote Thomas Insel,
the new director of the national Institute of Mental health: ’Often, the general public assumes that
newdrugsornewtreatmentsdevelopalmostfromwholecloth, withoutrealizingthatthere’soften
a decade or more of basic science that feeds in to new discoveries that have clinical signiﬁcance.
It is important for us and a challenge for us to make sure the public understands the importance
of investing in basic science as a pathway to improving therapeutics.’
8.5.6 Young Investigators
The dramatic trend of loosing brilliant post-doc’ to the US must be reversed. The main reason is
often the lack of support ( including laboratory space) for independent research of these young
investigators. We must invent something like the RO1 of NIH, especially for those who have
acquiredexpertiseinbrainstudiesofprimates. TheyfacethemostdifﬁcultiestoreturntoEurope.
8.6 Future research
8.6.1 Improve recording and local manipulation techniques
The electrode arrays can be further improved to record from more sites, increase the likelihood of
recording single neurons, or at least quality multiunit activity, over long periods of time, without
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Study the possibility to inject electric signals back into the electrodes for stimulation, perturba-
tion of brain regions or other use.
Methods to assess damage and to visualize in vivo electrode location are important.
To miniaturize the connections and pre-amplifying systems is important, as are wireless connec-
tions so that the animal could move its head.
To improve ways of delivery of local chemicals to inﬂuence neuronal activity (and control the
size of the effect), as well as to increase the range of such chemicals is useful.
8.6.2 Improve and diversify brain imaging techniques
To improve the S/N ratio and consequently spatial resolution either by increasing ﬁeld strength,
better coil design or MR sequences, or by improving on contrast agents are important topics.
To make the contrast agents available and acceptable for human use, even for restricted clinical
applications would be valuable.
A better understanding of the vascular phenomena and neural activity phenomena underlying the
different MR signals is critical for interpretation of fMRI signals: ’what are deactivations ’ do
we see inhibition and excitation in fMRI? Is adaptation or priming, as it is sometimes referred to,
really a measure of selectivity. Can neuronal selectivity be revealed by other means in the fMRI.
DevisenewsequencesornewtypesofMRmeasurementstoextendtherangeofbrainphenomena
that can be visualized non invasively: anatomical connections, transmitter systems and other
important neurochemical substances.
While it will take some time before we can scan a human subject who walks in a ﬁeld, we should
try to lift many of the restrictions on the motor and sensory side imposed on the subjects during
scanning Single cells and EEG are being measured in the scanner but this is an exception, these
techniques should become routine and robust.
All brain imaging techniques, used in humans and even in clinical settings, have yet to be prop-
erly validated. It is essential to validate them in realistic animal models. For higher cognitive
functions, which are the essence of human functional imaging, validation in the monkey is es-
sential.
Monkey fMRI, especially in the awake animal, also opens an almost unlimited avenue of phar-
macological research. Pharmacological companies suffer from a large gap between assessment
of new potential drugs in small animals and in humans. Many drugs fail in that interval which
could be bridged by pharmacological monkey fMRI studies. The potential savings in money and
time are vast ( up to 80
8.6.3 New mathematics for Neuroscience
We badly need more incisive techniques to treat multi single cell recordings. We should go
beyond correlation techniques, which are now the main tool used. Probably a mathematical
treatment of complex dynamic systems can help, but the stochastic nature and non stationarity
of the signals, as well as their sparseness and incompleteness should be considered. If possible
these techniques should allow introduction of a priori information such as cell types present,8.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 79
anatomical connections etc. This should allow study of input output relationships between brain
regions, of functional architecture of a region, or of the local circuits present in a region of sub-
part (canonical column e.g.). Fusion of different brain imaging modalities such as fMRI and
EEG or MEG should be further improved. The visualization of the results both spatially and in
time will be important. Techniques to provide general interpretation and integration schemes,
such as new coordinate systems, brain atlases, and warping algorithms to compare brains, are
important. fMRI measurements contain a wealth of information that is only feebly used; De-
velopment of new signal processing tools to extract relevant signals of activity, connectivity and
their dynamics are key. Concepts such as the Granger causality (Granger, 1980) hold some
promise to model cerebral networks from neuro-imaging data by testing causality between two
timeseries (e.g., Freiwald et al., 1999; Chavez et al., 2003). Furthermore, one should perform an
exploratory network analysis, rather than starting from a predeﬁned network, perhaps in combi-
nation with Granger causality, but then extended to a conditional deﬁnition, i.e., causality from x
to y, given additional time series z. Finally, one needs to develop mathematical tools to relate the
multiple single cell recording, or their local ﬁeld potentials equivalent, to global signals such as
fMRI or EEG signals that will have been recorded simultaneously. Again we should go beyond
correlation.
8.6.4 Visual and motor systems
The newly development tools hold promise to unravel the important issues of systems neuro-
science in ways directly relevant to functioning of the human brain and to understanding the
malfunctioning brain.
Visual system
In vision the main issues of segmentation, extraction of 3D shape and motion, of building shape,
material, action and scene representations for recognition, categorization and visuo-motor con-
trol as well as cross modal integration should be addressed. While we can link at a coarse level
the different visual cortical areas with these different functions (dorsal and ventral streams), the
detailed functions of the different (over 30) areas are largely unknown. In the same vein, coding
of a number of image features has been documented, but it is completely unclear which dimen-
sions of 2/3D shape, which material properties, which action primitives or scene dimensions are
encoded at high levels in the visual system. We largely miss the dynamics of the visual system,
which adapts itself to the task at hand. While top-down modulations of all sorts are very im-
portant, their study cannot replace the investigation of the visual functions as such, which are
largely neglected. The role of parietal cortex in representation of space (or probably multiple
spaces such as near, reachable, or distant space,) in decisions and in attention should be further
studied, in addition to its links with the premotor cortex (see below). Most robots or other intel-
ligent artifact use vision as one of their main senses, unless these biological vision functions are
better understood at the algorithmic level, construction of intelligent vision machines that share
at least some of the performances of the human visual system are illusory.
Motor system
In the motor system the multiplicity of cortical areas also calls for further investigation
1. The role of the fronto-dependent motor areas (F6 and F7) is only hypothetical. These80 CHAPTER 8. THE BRAINPROBE PROJECT
areas (and especially F6) represent the main avenue through which the frontal lobe con-
trols the motor cortex. It is through this area that the action representations coded in the
parieto-premotor circuits become actions. Understanding this control may be of enormous
advantage for constructing robots or other artifacts that, on one side, code external vi-
sual stimuli in a format ready for action, on the other emit responses only when particular
contingencies are met.
2. The transformation of the intrinsic properties of objects into the selection of appropriate
hand action, that takes place in the parieto-premotor circuit AIP-F5 needs further study.
For example, how does the AIP-F5 premotor circuit know the quality of objects? Recent
anatomical data suggest that the interaction between the pragmatic aspects and semantics
aspect of objects are mediated by input coming from infero-temporal lobe to the motor rep-
resentations of the inferior parietal lobule. The knowledge of how semantic and pragmatic
description of object interact will be of enormous value for the construction of artifacts
able to interact with object in an intelligent way (intelligent artiﬁcial arms).
3. The discovery of mirror neurons (see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) provided the
basis for understanding the mechanism of imitations. Yet, there are virtually no data on
how mirror neurons are re-organized when an individual learn a new action. Experiments
are needed to test hypotheses postulating that the observed action (the model) activates pre-
extant motor acts coded by mirror neurons and then through the action of the prefrontal
lobethesemotoractsarere-combinedinnewconﬁgurationsidenticaltothoseofthemodel.
It obvious that imitation mechanism now is a fundamental issue because of the enormous
economical possibilities that will open for construction of robot or other devices that could
learn by imitation.
4. The link between the motor areas coding action and the primary motor cortex M1 (F1)
coding mostly movements are little understood. The connections however between these
areas, includingthebackwardprojections fromF1toF5, mayexplainthe formationofneu-
rons or neuronal assemblies able to integrate higher order sensory information conveyed to
premotor areas with knowledge concerning action execution, giving the individual a deep
knowledge of action meaning. Understanding how motor knowledge is formed could be a
fundamental step in the construction of really intelligent artifacts.
As mentioned above for the visual system, many of the fundamental problems outlined above
can be solved by chronic recordings of action potentials and ﬁeld potentials in the behaving pri-
mates using multiple electrodes and by exploiting the now available possibility to employ fMRI
techniques in monkeys. This latter technical development represents a fundamental step that
allows one to link classical neurophysiological monkey studies with human brain imaging stud-
ies (PET, fMRI, MEG, quantitative EEG). The combined used of these techniques and combine
use of monkey and human experiments will solve in addition to problem sketched above also
other problems here not discussed such as the role of the dorsal premotor areas in movement
organization, the role of premotor cortex in association leaning, and last but not least the neural
mechanism of intentionality, that is the understanding of why an action has been preformed (its8.7. FIRST IMPETUS 81
distant purpose).
Other systems
Given its importance in cognitive functions prefrontal cortex should be explored more vigorously
at this side of the Atlantic ocean. Also we should ensure a minimum coverage of other important
regions of the primate brain such as the tactile cortex, medial temporal cortex and deep brain
structures, auditory regions.
8.6.5 Development of software for modeling at and across different levels of in-
tegration
See other chapter.
8.6.6 Theories of cognition and design of cognitive tasks
However powerful the tools at the disposable of the neuroscientist, the quality of the experiment
depends in the end on the paradigms used. Advances in cognitive and neuroscience theory should
lead to richer descriptions of the tasks the system is performing. In addition is should generate
hypotheses which can be tested with more reﬁned paradigms. Such paradigms should contain
gradually less and less abstraction compared to real life situations (e.g. monkeys using tools,
taking elevators (in virtual reality)).
8.6.7 Theory of brain function at neuronal, network, functional region and sys-
tem level
The complexity of the brain is such that the amount of data collected and to be collected is
enormous. It is generally accepted that modeling will be important to generate understanding.
However in addition to modeling theories about the brain and its functions are important. A
model is nothing else than a vast piece of software that captures the data as closely as possible.
Beyond that we have to understand the data. Just like playing with a mathematical formula that
captures physical reality generates understanding of this reality, we will have to run lots of sim-
ulations on the model to understand what each neuron, circuit, functional region is contributing
to the behavior that we are observing.
8.7 First impetus
A concrete plan for the immediate future could be concentrated on four directions.
1. To strengthen the research basis, support of systems neuroscience proposals in primates
with as hallmark novel and incisive designs. As mentioned above the most performing
European laboratories easily match the competition of the American of Japanese labs. We
need more of them, covering all aspects of neuroscience. So we should encourage young
researchers, who often have been in the US, to set up their own independent group. We
may have to device special grants or awards, and include provision for laboratory space.82 CHAPTER 8. THE BRAINPROBE PROJECT
These proposals should primarily use primates, unless a speciﬁc question can be addressed
in lower animals. This should however remain the minority as Europe has been wast-
ing huge amounts of money supporting systems studies in lower animals while the same
questions were addressed in primates in the US or Japan. This is one of the main reasons
pharmaceutical research is leaving Europe for the US. The main requirement would be for
the studies to introduce new more realistic designs, such as those the Japanese have been
introducing: use of a tool, monkeys taking the elevator (in virtual reality) etc, or tackling
in more incisive ways different cognitive functions.
To encourage such proposals, ﬂexible mechanisms should be devised, perhaps on a con-
tinuous basis rather than a single call.
2. To foster by all possible ways the introduction and widespread use of multi-electrode
recordings. Since many of the problems are technical, we should favor proposals linking
neurophysiological teams with SMEs e.g. Thomas recording in Germany or with engineer-
ing groups. Here the EU could play a role of catalyst in bringing these groups together.
Also proposals that favor the understanding of the blood supply and other physiological re-
quirements of the brain, should be welcome. Again it is imported to realize that in rodents
most of these problems do not occur or have largely be solved, and that we need proposals
targeting the primate brain. As these multi-electrodes are introduced we should support
the development of software to record, display and analyze this wealth of data.
3. To foster the integration of different non-invasive imaging techniques in the primate, no-
tably fMRI, EEG and MEG. This integration is not yet solved in humans and even if it
were there is no obvious way to validate the solution in humans. In non-human primates
the veriﬁcation is easy: compare the generators ( or ﬁelds of generators) postulated from on
invasive imaging with the direct recordings in the corresponding brain area. This aspect is
extremely attractive from the EU perspective, as the validation of this imaging integration
is the condition for widespread clinical use and can also lead to industrial products. After
all two of the four major companies producing brain scanners are European. Also progress
in these non-invasive techniques allows reducing the number of animals in research.
The particular problem will be to ﬁnd mechanism for the European groups that are per-
forming monkey fMRI to acquire expensive equipment required for MEG. The creation of
EU sponsored centers of excellence of a particular type, in which the neuroscience team
is linked with companies producing the equipment and functions as a testsite, is a possible
mechanism. Again we are envisioning projects linking academia with industry but under
close EU patronage to guarantee the long-term perspective over the short-term view tra-
ditionally adopted by industry. This strategy might prove particularly interesting to foster
other developments, which are also technology-driven, e.g. scanning of a walking person.
4. Increase the awareness in mathematical circles for the need of neuro-mathematics. This
will take time but the sooner we start the better. The traditional way would be to call
workshops and symposia. It is not clear that this will work. Sustained support of brilliant8.8. ETHICAL PROBLEMS 83
individuals, who are interested in building bridges and attract mathematicians to at least
understand their questions and problems, may be a way forward.
8.8 Ethical problems
Although the funding for the neuroscience experiments is justiﬁed here from the point of view
of information technology, it should be clear that the rationale for the experiments themselves is
the understanding of the brain critical for human health. While is may true that only 20The need
for primate research is not always well understood by the general public. It is crucial to inform
the public and the authorities of the following three points.
1. The need and particularities (slow, painstaking, tortuous nature) of basic research. The
general public should realize that pressing immediately for applied research is generally a
waste of money leading if any to ad hoc, non robust solutions.
2. The distance between basic biological research and clinically relevant medical research is
long in general but especially so in brain research due to the immense complexity of the
brain.
3. The need for using the adequate animal model. At this point non- invasive techniques
of brain imaging not only lack the resolution in space and time compared to single cell
studies, but also have not been validated, hence the need of using animal models. On the
other hand when invasive techniques are being used the choice of animal model depends on
the function investigated. For higher order functions and most cognitive function primates
are the only option. It is clear that even the primate model is not perfect (since the monkey
brain is too small compared to that of humans). The adequacy of the primate model can
now be handled efﬁciently since imaging allows addressing the homology between the
brains of different species.
In counterpart it should be clear that the neuroscientists are using all possible ways (including
the development of imaging) to reduce the need of invasive investigation and animal models in
general, but also that they take great care of the physical and psychological well being of the
subjects in their care.
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